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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the market’s reaction to announcements of dividend 
increases. In particular, it considers the factors that affect the magnitude of abnormal 
returns during the days that surround announcements of dividend increases. The objective 
is to find whether the market reaction to dividend increases has weakened with the 
passage of time and whether market conditions affect the reaction. Eventually, this study 
is expected to reveal whether dividends continue to be important to investors.  
This research is motivated by the findings of Fama and French (2001). They 
suggest that since 1978 firms have had a declining propensity to pay dividends. They 
propose that dividends are declining as a result of the ease by which investors can make 
homemade dividends through selling small portions of their holdings.  They argue that 
recent market developments, particularly the introduction of negotiated commissions and 
discount brokers, have made homemade dividends easier and less costly.  Their results 
may suggest that investors are now less interested to receive dividends than in the past. 
One objective of this study is to examine whether investor’s preferences regarding 
dividend payments have changed over time. This is accomplished by measuring the 
abnormal returns following announcements of dividend increases. Benartzi, Michaely, 
and Thaler (1997) suggest that the reaction of the market to dividend increases is an 
acceptable method of determining the value of dividends to investors.   
In addition, this study explores the theoretical factors that may affect dividend 
valuation.  Previous studies, such as Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000), suggest that the 
existence of debt holders and institutional investors reduce the potential for agency costs 
as these stakeholders monitor managers. In contrast, Jensen (1986) suggests that high 
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cash flows make it easier for managers to spend on perquisites and empire building. 
Thus, the potential for agency costs increases. Therefore, paying dividends when cash 
flows are high reduces the likelihood of agency costs. At the same time, Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997) suggest that increasing dividends following higher cash 
flows signals management’s expectation that future performance warrants a dividend 
increase. Consequently, the agency and signaling theories suggest that investors may 
react positively to dividend increases when cash flows are high.  
Several observations are obtained from this study. First, investor reaction to 
dividend increases seems to have weakened over time.  Second, the reaction is different 
when the increase is announced in a bear market rather than in a bull market.  Third, the 
market reaction to dividend increases is less in firms that are more liquid. This finding 
may be interpreted as evidence that dividends are valued less in more liquid firms 
because it is easier for the investors of these firms to make homemade dividends. Fourth, 
the magnitude of the reaction is directly related to the increase in trading volume 
following the announcement. 
Surprisingly, the evidence disputes the predictions of the agency cost theory of 
dividends. This theory states that dividends are valued because they decrease the amount 
of cash available to management, which in turn decreases the potential for waste.  Given 
this theory, it is expected that firms with high debt loads already have agency costs 
decreased so the market reaction to their dividend increases would be less than other 
firms while firms with high free cash flows would have a greater market reaction to their 
dividend increases because of the large potential for waste on management’s part. 
Instead, the results suggest that firms with high debt loads experience positive market 
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reaction following dividend increases while firms with large free cash flows experience 
negative reactions. It seems that the signaling theory of dividends is contributing heavily 
to this result.  
Future research should be directed to investigate the possibility that share 
repurchases may be replacing dividends as a way to redistribute surplus cash to 
shareholders. In addition, future studies may focus on the signaling theory of dividends as 
useful tool to explain the dividend policies of corporations.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter links the objectives of this research to the current state of knowledge 
regarding dividends and the theory of the firm. It shows that previous studies do not consider 
investors’ interest in receiving dividends or whether investors’ attitude towards dividends is 
changing over time or varies with market conditions. Given this gap in the literature, the results 
of this study are likely to increase our knowledge of investors’ behaviour towards dividends and 
whether investors’ demand for dividend payments is decreasing over time.  
The chapter starts with a brief summary of the research objectives. Section 1.2 
summarizes the history of dividend payments that started over 400 years ago in Europe as 
payoffs from sea voyages.  Section 1.3 suggests that the dividend irrelevance propositions of 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) do not necessarily apply in practice. Many empirical studies 
suggest that the value of a firm is positively related to the size of its dividend payments as 
suggested by the dividend discount model. The section goes on to summarize the recent 
developments in dividend theory and to describe the recent practices.  Section 1.4 briefly reviews 
the literature that serves as the main motivation for this research. It suggests that dividend 
payments have been changing over time but previous research stops short of considering 
investors’ reaction towards dividend payments. Section 1.5 provides a summary of the main 
findings of this thesis.    
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1.1 Research Questions 
Extensive research, for example Fama and French (2001), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (2003), and Allen and Michaely (2003), has been done to explain why firms pay 
dividends, the appropriate dividend policy, and the alternative ways to distribute earnings to 
shareholders. They report that corporations have changed the ways by which they make 
distributions to shareholders and the importance they place on dividends.  
In contrast, little research has been done to explain the behaviour of investors towards 
dividends. This study examines whether over time investors have changed their reaction to 
dividend increases. If the market reaction is weakening over time it means that the investors’ 
demand for dividends is decreasing. Investors, corporate managers, and policy makers would be 
interested to know whether investors’ demand for dividends has changed over time. In addition, 
this study investigates whether investors’ reaction to dividend varies as a function of different 
market conditions. For example, corporate stakeholders and policy makers may be interested to 
know whether the reaction of investors to dividend increases during bear market conditions is 
different from the reaction during bull markets. 
1.2 A Brief History of the Evolution of Dividends 
Frankfurter and Wood (1997) provide a brief history of how the payment of dividends 
evolved over time. The first dividends were paid during the 16th century when Sea Captains in 
Holland and Great Britain began selling financial claims on their voyages.  At the end of the 
voyage the ship along with all of its cargo were sold and the profits, if any, were then distributed 
proportionally to the different owners of the enterprise.  These distributions were essentially 
liquidating dividends.  As time passed these financial claims began trading among different 
investors, and sea captains with successful track records began to demand more for a financial 
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claim on their particular voyages.  This system further evolved as people realized that the costs 
associated with start-up and total liquidation could be avoided if the Sea Captain committed to 
several voyages at a time and that a percentage of profits could be paid out each time the Captain 
returned to harbour.   
In the years that followed these initial sea voyages, more sophisticated corporate charters 
were set up in other capital intensive industries such as mining, banking, insurance, utilities, and 
railroads.  Adam Smith in the “Wealth of Nations” believed that managers of these different 
corporations were motivated to pay dividends in order to pacify and thus keep shareholders from 
fully monitoring management’s activities. Over the years, economists developed models to relate 
the value of a corporation to the value of the dividends it pays. The common conclusion among 
financial practitioners and academics was that a firm could increase its value by increasing the 
amount of its dividends.  This was a direct result of the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) which 
continues to be a prominent topic in entry level finance textbooks.1  The DDM says that the 
value of any common share is a function of the future dividends expected to be received by the 
share and the required rate of return on the stock.  This model is defined in the following 
formula: 
t
t
t r
DP
)1(1
0 +=∑
∞
=
      Eq. 1 
 where  P0 = the price of the stock today 
  Dt  = the dividend to be received at the end of period t 
  r  = the required rate of return 
                                                 
1 For examples, see Ross, Westerfield, Jordan, and Roberts (2007), Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, fifth 
Canadian Edition. 
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The relation between dividends and the value of the firm as proposed by the DDM 
continued to dominate the thinking of financial professionals and academics until the publication 
of the dividend irrelevance theorem by Modigliani and Miller (1961). Their seminal work 
revolutionized the way theoreticians and practitioners view dividends and ushered the beginning 
of new era of research on the role of dividends. 
1.3  Recent Theoretical Developments  
Under conditions of perfect capital markets, Modigliani and Miller (1961) prove that a 
firm’s value is independent of its dividend policy. Their definition of perfect capital markets 
means corporations and investors do not pay taxes, transaction costs are negligible, investors are 
rational, information is readily available at negligible costs, and investors are as informed as 
managers. Unfortunately markets are not perfect and previous studies suggest that the dividend 
policy continues to affect the value of common shares as suggested by the DDM.  For example, 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), show that a firm’s stock price changes with changes in its 
dividend policy. Yet, the factors that affect this relation continue to be topics of debate and 
academic research. Propositions attempting to explain the dividend policy include arguments 
suggesting that (1) the dividend policy serves as a signal of future earnings growth, (2) investors 
feel that cash in hand is superior to an unrealized capital gain, (3) investors value dividends when 
the alternative ways to distribute money to shareholders are more costly, and (4) as a way to 
decrease the potential waste of resources by management.   
In addition, research in the theory of dividends has considered the issues a firm faces 
when it decides on a dividend policy. These issues include (1) how much should be given to 
shareholders, (2) what should the dividend payout ratio be, (3) how much financial slack does 
the firm need to maintain, (4) is the payout level sustainable, (5) and what method of distribution 
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would shareholders prefer. These decisions have far reaching effects on a company’s flexibility 
to pursue other activities such as investing in real assets and debt issuance.  It is also important to 
note that these decisions must be made on a continual basis. 
In summary, following the dividend irrelevance propositions of Modigliani and Miller 
(1961), many theories and justifications have been proposed to explain why firms continue to 
pay dividends and why investors continue to value them.  These explanations focus on the 
following issues: 
Information Asymmetry  
An environment of information asymmetry arises when one party has more knowledge 
concerning a venture, a transaction, and/or a contract than another party.  The literature on 
information asymmetry started with Akerlof  (1970) who details the information asymmetries 
that exist in the used car market.  In the context of corporate finance, it is widely accepted that a 
firm’s managers have more information regarding the future performance of the firm than its 
shareholders do. Many studies, starting with Watts (1973), propose that management may use 
dividends to convey information to the market and to shareholders. Thus, dividend payments 
decrease the firm’s information asymmetries. 
Agency Problems  
Jensen (1986) highlights this problem and notes that management has the incentive to 
redirect the firm’s money from positive NPV projects to items that directly benefit management.  
Some examples of this type of misuse of funds are lavish perquisites, empire building 
(purchasing other companies for the sole purpose of managing a larger company), and excessive 
management compensation.  Jensen (1986) suggests that paying dividends reduces the amount of 
excess cash that managers can spend in these ways, thereby reducing potential agency problems.   
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Institutional Constraints 
Many institutions, trusts, and endowment funds have imposed constraints on the types of 
investments they are allowed to invest in.  One such common constraint is to avoid low or non-
dividend paying firms. Previous studies such as Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) propose 
arguments, known as the dividend clientele theory, that justify payment of dividends in order to 
satisfy the needs of such investors.  
Expropriation of Wealth  
 Some studies, for example Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984), propose that shareholders 
may attempt to expropriate wealth from bondholders and creditors by paying dividends.  This 
would primarily be a concern if a firm is likely to discontinue its operations in the near future. 
Long, Malitz, and Sefcik (1994) explore this proposition and find that managers do not use 
dividends to expropriate wealth from others. 
Transaction Costs 
Early studies such as Bhattacharya (1979) argue that some investors need periodic cash 
income from their investments. For such investors, the alternatives include receiving periodic 
dividends or selling small portions of their investments. However, selling securities incurs 
transaction costs. For some investors it may be more cost efficient to have management issue 
dividends to generate income instead of shareholders generating their own income by 
periodically selling small parts of their holdings.  Fama and French (2001) argue that transaction 
costs have decreased over time. Therefore, the desirability for dividends may have decreased as 
some investors are now creating their own homemade dividend.  
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Behavioural Issues 
 Theories of human behaviour may explain the reasons why dividends continue to be 
desirable despite the arguments that they may be irrelevant. Behavioural finance studies argue 
that investors view capital gains and dividends distinctly and as a result they should not be 
considered perfect substitutes for each other.  For example, Thaler (1983) describes how 
dividends can be viewed as a silver lining during down markets or as an added bonus during bull 
markets. Thus, investors may demand dividends even if there are more efficient and cost 
effective methods of distribution.  
Tax Considerations 
Allen and Michaely (2001) suggest that share repurchases are replacing dividend 
payments as a way to distribute earnings to shareholders. Theoretically, when a firm has excess 
cash and repurchases shares, the shareholders who keep their holding constant should benefit 
from the share appreciation that follows the repurchases. The capital gains that may be created 
can be realized by selling small portions of their holdings. Essentially, share repurchases create 
capital gains to investors while dividend payments create dividend income. Dividends are 
considered to be ordinary income by Tax Laws but investors may receive tax credits or may not 
pay taxes on dividends. In contrast, share repurchases create capital gains that are usually taxed 
at a rate lower than the rate on dividends. Furthermore, even if the tax rates are identical, share 
repurchases allow investors to delay the realization of capital gains hence the delay of tax 
payments. Overall, tax considerations may make some investors prefer dividend income 
(because of tax exemption status) while they make others prefer share repurchases because they 
reduce taxes and allow investors to delay the taxation of their returns.  
1.4  Specific Research that Motivates this Study  
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Fama and French (2001) document changes in managerial behaviour towards dividends 
over the past 25 years. They find firms that pay dividends usually have specific characteristics 
that distinguish them from other firms. Once they control for these characteristics, they find that 
firms that posses them have a declining propensity to pay dividends. Furthermore, they report 
that these characteristics are becoming less common in firms who are now listing on stock 
exchanges.  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2003) consider the same time period that is examined 
by Fama and French (2001) and find that the total payout of dividends in real dollars has actually 
increased.  Combining their results with those of Fama and French (2001) leads to the conclusion 
that fewer firms are paying dividends, but those who do pay them are paying larger amounts. In 
addition, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2003) consider the role of special dividends in the 
payout policies of corporations. They observe that the use of special dividends as a way to 
distribute earnings has been declining. They hypothesize that share repurchases may have 
replaced special dividends as a method of returning money to shareholders when the firm does 
not want to commit to a higher dividend level. However, they conclude that special dividends are 
used less often because they served as a substitute to regular dividends.  
Allen and Michaely (2003) provide an extensive review of the payout policies of 
corporations including both share repurchases and dividend payments. They suggest that 
historically dividends have been the most important form of payout but share repurchases are 
becoming a more important part of a firm’s payout policy.  For example the average dividend 
and share repurchase payouts (payout is defined as dividends paid or expenditure on repurchases 
divided by the firm’s earnings) in the 1970s were 38% and 3% respectively.  In the 1980s the 
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average dividend payout increased to 58% while the average share repurchase payout increased 9 
times to 27%. In addition, Allen and Michaely (2003) report the following observations: 
1) Large, established corporations typically pay out a significant amount of their earnings in the 
form of dividends and repurchases, and the amount of total payout is increasing.   
2) The proportion of dividend paying firms has been steadily declining and that firms who 
initiate payout policies are more likely to do so with share repurchases. 
3) Individuals in high tax brackets receive a large percentage of cash dividends paid and these 
individuals pay substantial amounts of taxes on them.  They find that for most of the years 
between 1973-1996 individuals received more than 50% of all dividends, but this percentage 
declined in the latter parts of their survey.  For example, in 1988 individuals received 60% of 
all dividends paid. In 1996, this percentage declined to 35%. 
4) Corporations smooth dividends relative to earnings, which is not surprising as Lintner (1956) 
came to the same conclusion.  He found that management sets dividend policy first, and then 
adjusts other policies as needed.  For example, if a firm was undertaking a large investment 
that needed more cash than was available, management wouldn’t consider cutting the 
dividend but would instead look for other sources of capital to help fund the project.  
5) Data supports the view that share repurchases are more volatile than dividends. Their sample, 
which runs from 1972-1998, suggests that on an annual basis aggregate dividends fell only 
twice during this period by an average of 3.25%. In contrast, annual aggregate share 
repurchases fell six times by an average of 29.46%. 
6) The market reacts positively to firms that either increase their dividends or initiate a share 
repurchase. In contrast, the market reacts negatively to a firm that decreases its payout 
policy. 
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1.5  Summary Findings of this Thesis 
 The new ideas that are presented in this thesis are the possibility that investors are less 
concerned with dividends now than they once were, and that investors’ reaction to dividend 
increase is different depending on market sentiment (ie bull vs. bear market).  Evidence is found 
to support the idea that investor reaction to dividend increases is smaller in the later time periods.  
This supports the idea that dividends are no longer as important to investors.  There is also 
evidence to support the idea that investors value dividends less in a bear market when compared 
to a bull market.  These are important discoveries as it is the first time that a change in the 
reaction to a dividend increase has been noted.  Reactions to dividend increases are used because 
Michaely Thaler and Womack (1997) find that these reactions can act as a proxy for dividend 
valuation, and as a result, the argument can be extended to the possibility that dividends are not 
valued as much as they once were, and that they are valued less in a bear market when compared 
to a bull market.   
Also, in this study many of the relationships of agency theory are explored.  Surprisingly, 
not a single predicted relationship holds.  This means that other dividend theories (ie signalling) 
should be explored in future research.    
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
Dividends continue to be an important tool for the management of modern corporations. 
These days, the common practice for many corporations is to pay dividends periodically on a 
quarterly basis. The majority of dividend-paying corporations tend to maintain a constant level of 
dividends even when earnings are lower than current dividend levels. In such a case, 
management takes money from retained earnings or even borrows to keep the stream of 
dividends flowing.  In studying the history of dividend policies, Frankfurter and Wood (1997) 
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state that dividends have become nothing more than “symbolic” or “token” distributions that are 
paid at the discretion of management, and that they do not serve any real economic purpose. 
They believe that this is a direct result of the separation between ownership and management and 
that paying dividends has become a custom in which management is continually buying 
shareholders’ faith that future earnings will be forthcoming.  Frankfurter and Wood (1997) 
conclude that dividend-payment patterns, more generally known as the dividend policies, are a 
“cultural phenomenon, influenced by customs, beliefs, regulations, public opinion, perceptions 
and hysteria, general economic conditions, and several other factors, all in perpetual change, 
impacting different firms differently.” This study is an attempt to confirm this conclusion using 
the market reaction to announcements of dividend increases as an indicator of investors’ interest 
in the size and stability of dividend payments. 
 
 11 
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the prior research on dividends.  Specifically it discusses the 
theories that try to explain dividend behaviour of firms, and how firm behaviour regarding 
dividends and its payout policy has changed.     
 Section 2.1 reviews the models and evidence for the signalling hypothesis.  Signalling 
theories try to explain dividends as a signal of private information about the firm that is not 
available in standard sources; such as news announcements and audited financial statements.  
The main conclusions about signalling theory is that dividends serve as a signal that past 
earnings increases are permanent and not transitory. 
 The second section deals with the models that describe dividends as a way to reduce 
agency costs.  Agency costs are the result of managers making decisions that are to their benefit, 
instead of to the benefit of shareholders.  Dividends reduce the potential of managers to waste 
money as they reduce the amount of resources at management’s discretion.   
 Section 2.3 discusses the literature that corresponds to dividend clientele models.  These 
models feel that dividends are paid in order to make firms attractive to certain clienteles.  For 
example, some endowment charters state that a firm must pay out a certain percentage of its 
profits as dividends in order to be considered for an investment.  On the other hand, some 
clienteles do not want dividends, as they would rather have the firm reinvest the cash to grow 
market share.  Thus, there are different investors that seek out different types of investments 
based on dividend behaviour.    
 The fourth section, section 2.4, deals with literature regarding behavioural finance’s 
explanation for dividends.  Behavioural finance is a relatively new field of study that starts with 
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the assumptions that economic agents are not always rational, and that they do not always want 
to maximize their utility.  This section deals with different theories that try to explain how 
dividends are used and valued by investors in ways that may not be value maximizing.   
 Section 2.5 discusses the relationship that exists between share repurchases and 
dividends.  This is important as both are part of a firm’s larger payout policy.  This section shows 
that share repurchases can serve the same purpose as dividends; mainly, they can reduce agency 
costs and send private signals to the market.  Share repurchases have the advantage over 
dividends in that they are considered to be a one-time payout, whereas the market expects an 
increased dividend to be maintained.   
 The final section, section 2.6, details the literature relating to changes in the pattern of 
dividend behaviour of firms.  It details the results of papers that show that fewer firms are paying 
dividends, and that those that do pay dividends are paying larger ones.  It also discusses the 
changes that have occurred to share repurchases and special dividends over time. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to fully introduce the literature relating to 
dividends.  It is necessary to do this in order to introduce the hypotheses that follow in the next 
chapter.     
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2.1 Information Asymmetry and Signalling 
The assumption that all participants in a market have equal knowledge of that said market 
would result in everyone having identical information sets.  In this situation all shareholders, 
managers, creditors, analysts, and competitors would have equal access to a firm’s financial 
results, research and development projects, operations, etc.  This obviously is not the case in real 
markets.  It would be difficult for management to add value to a firm in this situation because 
competitors could easily copy a firm’s profitable strategies.  Examples of secrets that 
management keeps are the Colonel’s famous chicken recipe and Coca-Cola’s exact mixture for 
its syrup.   Profitability for these companies depends to a certain extent on maintaining 
information asymmetries. Without information asymmetries generic colas when compared to 
name brand colas would taste the same, cost less, and thereby dominate the market. 
 If management has to maintain information asymmetries in order to keep its firm 
profitable, management must find appropriate signals to let the market know about its quality.  
Akerlof (1970) shows that signals must be costly to mimic otherwise poor quality firms will 
copy them and a ‘separating equilibrium’ will not be established.  A hypothesized separating 
equilibrium that has been studied is a firm’s dividend policy.  This theory states that high quality 
firms should pursue a dividend policy that is too costly for low quality firms to mimic. 
 The first model to attempt to show how dividends can act as a signalling device was 
proposed by Bhattacharya (1979).  He proposed that managers signal their firm’s quality to the 
market by pre-committing to a dividend policy.  The means by which the funds are available to 
pay this dividend are known only to management.  An assumption of this model is that if the 
firm cannot pay for dividends out of internally generated funds, it will turn to more costly 
outside financing in order to pay for the dividend.  A firm that has higher predictability of cash 
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flows will have lower costs of paying a dividend (because it would less likely need outside 
financing) than a firm with unstable and unpredictable cash flows.  This results in the low quality 
firm finding it too costly to mimic this signal.  This model is criticized because firms are not 
contractually committed to pay dividends, especially pre-committed dividends.  Firms may seek 
costly outside financing to pay a dividend, but are under no obligation to do so.  This lack of 
obligation results in investors not placing any importance on pre-committed dividends. 
 A second model is proposed by John and Williams (1985).  This model assumes that 
dividends or net new issues of shares reveal all private information about a firm not conveyed by 
corporate audits, financial statements, and other required disclosures.  In this model firms paying 
higher dividends have more favourable inside information, and thus have higher stock prices.  
The optimal dividend policy involves dividend smoothing and higher dividends when the tax 
disadvantages of dividends decrease relative to capital gains taxes.  This model also explains 
why firms would choose the costlier dividend policy over a relatively cheaper share repurchase 
program.  It is the higher cost of the dividend policy that attracts firms to pay dividends; in 
essence, they are purposely incurring the cost because they can afford to do so. 
This model also provides an explanation of why firms would pay dividends and 
simultaneously seek outside financing to fund new projects.  This course of action is justified 
because paying a dividend raises the price of the stock, resulting in less dilution of old 
shareholders when new equity is raised.  This results in the new shareholders paying the correct 
stock price.   
A third dividend signalling model is proposed by Miller and Rock (1985).  This model 
assumes that dividends and share repurchases are substitutes for each other and are part of a 
larger payout policy.  Therefore, a firm can pay a dividend or repurchase shares and send the 
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same signal to the market.  In this model, managers are assumed to have private information 
about future earnings that will finance future dividend payments and new investments.  Larger 
dividends (or share repurchases) result in a firm rejecting positive NPV projects and under 
investing.  Under investing is seen to be a cost that only better firms can incur because inferior 
firms cannot afford to pass up on such projects.  The equilibrium level of payout policy is 
reached when it is high enough that low quality firms cannot reduce their investments enough to 
match it. 
This model fails however, because it does not consider the differing tax treatments of 
dividends and capital gains (capital gains occur when shares are repurchased).  Once the 
consequence of higher taxes on dividends is considered, the model would have a firm pay out 
everything as a share repurchase.  As seen in the market, firms still pay dividends so this model 
does not adequately explain firm behaviour.   
All three models are difficult to test.  It is impossible to know if a firm is raising its 
dividend to mimic another firm, or if the dividend is raised to signal its own future profitability.  
These models also fail to answer what Fisher Black calls “The Dividend Puzzle” (1976).  In his 
article, Black reviews the question as to why firms pay dividends and points out that for every 
argument there is an equally convincing counter-argument.  He illustrates this by contrasting two 
firms, one that pays a dividend and a second that does not.  The market treats the firm that pays a 
dividend positively because the dividend represents a return of the shareholders initial 
investment.  However, the market also acts positively to a firm that does not pay a dividend 
because the firm might be signalling that it has many investment opportunities, and that paying a 
dividend would result in passing up on some of these.  In the second scenario, the investor might 
receive the double benefit of capital appreciation greater than the dividend foregone and the 
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lower tax rate applied to capital gains.  This illustrates how dividend payment can be interpreted 
depending on the investor’s paradigm and the context in which it is paid.   
If dividends are indeed sending a signal, what is the signal they are sending?  What is the 
investing public supposed to infer about a firm’s future if dividends are cut, omitted, raised, or 
initiated?  
Watts (1973) was the first to try to test the hypothesis that dividend changes forecast 
future cash flows and earnings.  His primary finding is that there is not a relation between 
unexpected dividend changes and future earnings announcements.  He also finds that there are 
not any abnormal returns in the months surrounding the dividend announcements.  Watts’ (1973) 
study has limited application because it focuses on monthly returns, which makes it difficult to 
differentiate the effects of dividend changes and other information releases.   
Healy and Palepu (1988) studied whether there is a significant change in a firm’s 
earnings surrounding dividend omissions and initiations.  Their study covers the period 1969-
1980 and includes those firms who have not paid a dividend for 10 years (for dividend 
initiations) or those firms that have paid a dividend for 10 consecutive years (the dividend 
omission study).  Their findings indicate that for dividend initiations, firms experience a 
permanent increase in earnings for the two years following and one year prior to the dividend 
initiation.   For dividend omissions, firms are found to have a permanent decrease in earnings for 
the year of and the year following the omission.  They conclude that dividend 
initiations/omissions signal future earnings, albeit that the signal is good for only 1 year with 
regards to omissions and 2 years with regards to initiations. 
Lintner (1956) stresses that firms only increase dividends when management believes 
that earnings have permanently increased.  Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) test this and 
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try to determine if changes in dividends reflect past or future earnings increases. Their test is 
designed to find the relationship (if one exists) between dividend increases and unexpected 
future earnings.  Unexpected future earnings are defined as the difference between the earnings 
that would have been predicted with all the relevant information except for the dividend increase 
and the actual earnings of a firm.  This implies that firms that increase dividends will have 
positive unexpected earnings, and firms that decrease dividends will have negative unexpected 
earnings.  The authors also hypothesize that the larger the dividend change, the larger the change 
in future earnings. 
In their study, the only relationship that Benartzi et al. (1997) were able to find was that 
dividend changes reflected the permanency of previous earnings increases.  They were unable to 
find a positive relationship between dividend changes and future earnings changes.  This 
suggests that if firms are sending a signal about earnings, it’s that the previous earnings increase 
is permanent and not transitory.  This confirms the earlier work of Watts (1973) and Lintner 
(1956) who also found that dividend increases reflect previous earnings increases. 
One of the things that has not been studied in regards to dividend and signalling theory is 
the possibility that other firm specific characteristics might either magnify or reduce the signal 
that dividends send.  Some of these characteristics (which will be discussed in future sections in 
this chapter) might be a firm’s debt load or the amount of institutional ownership in the firm.  
Also, if one subscribes to signalling theory, we do not know if the strength of the signal has 
declined over time. This is likely the case as investors have become more sophisticated and are 
more likely to know about a firm’s prospects through other means.   
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2.2  Agency Costs 
 Management constantly makes decisions that affect different stakeholders of the firm.  
Management’s decisions are dominated by shareholders’ concerns as other stakeholders have 
much less influence.  An agency relationship exists when one group is hired to make decisions 
on behalf of other groups.  Due to divergent interests between groups, these decisions can be 
self-serving, or they can cater to the needs of one group at the expense of another.   
 The agency conflict discussed in this thesis is the relationship between managers and 
shareholders.  The conflict arises between these two parties because management makes all of 
the value enhancing activities but they do not capture all of the benefits that arise from these 
activities.  This motivates managers to pursue activities in which they do receive the full benefit 
of their actions.  Easterbrook (1984) discusses this problem and points out two sources of agency 
costs: monitoring and risk aversion. Monitoring is essential because it helps to ensure that 
management acts in the best interests of shareholders and not other parties. Monitoring 
management is prohibitive to small shareholders because a shareholder bears the full cost of 
monitoring but only receives the benefits in proportion to his or her holdings.   
 The other agency cost he discusses is risk aversion on the part of managers.  Investors 
(assuming they are well diversified) are only interested in non-diversifiable risk; however, 
managers have a more vested interest in the success of the firm and are concerned with the firm’s 
total risk.  This increased interest comes from the possibility of losing their job, having increased 
amounts of wealth tied up in the firm, prestige associated with managing the firm, the ability to 
consume perquisites, etc.  The focus on total risk induces managers to choose lower risk projects 
at the expense of shareholders.  Shareholders preference is for riskier ventures that will increase 
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their returns and further diversify their portfolios.  Management can also change the risk profile 
of a firm by altering the firm’s debt to equity ratio. 
 Easterbrook (1984) proposes that both the monitoring and risk aversion problems can be 
avoided if the firm seeks outside financing.  Seeking outside financing mitigates the agency 
problem because new providers of capital are more effective in scrutinizing management.  New 
shareholders demand information before investing, and management is forced to cater to these 
demands.  Firms are forced through this monitoring process more often if they pay regular 
dividends because dividends decrease the amount of cash available to management. 
 Jensen (1986) discusses agency costs in relation to management’s desire to make the firm 
larger, even if the firm invests sub-optimally to achieve this goal.  Managers prefer to manage 
larger firms because doing so is correlated with more power and larger compensation packages.  
Management has the opportunity to invest sub-optimally if there are large amounts of free cash 
flows in the firm.  He defines free cash flows as the amounts of excess cash that a firm has left-
over after it has invested in all positive NPV projects.  The greater the amounts of free cash flow, 
the greater the potential conflict that exists between management and shareholders.  He argues 
that shareholders are better served if free cash flows are minimized through dividend payouts.  
He also concludes that leverage increasing activities have the same effect on management as the 
firm becomes committed to regular interest payments.   
 In order to decrease the amount of agency costs between managers and shareholders most 
executive compensation is now tied to firm performance.  Managers are paid substantial bonuses 
if the firm meets certain targets, but more importantly managers receive a significant amount of 
their remuneration through stock option plans.  Stock options allow the manager to benefit more 
from their value enhancing activities at the firm.   
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 Lambert, Lanen, and Larker (1989) examine the initiation of stock option plans and 
changes in corporate dividend policy.  A dividend payment reduces a firm’s share price roughly 
by the amount of the dividend.  Because most stock option plans are not dividend protected, they 
hypothesize that the initiation of a stock option plan encourages corporate executives to reduce 
dividends.  Their results show that the initiation of stock option plans for senior corporate 
executives significantly lowers the amount of dividends paid by a firm.  These results are 
important because they illustrate that management’s use of dividends has evolved, and if it has 
evolved, it is a distinct possibility that the market’s reaction to dividend changes has also 
evolved. 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) test the two competing free cash flow and signalling 
hypotheses.  They propose that firms who have excess free cash flows have a tendency to over-
invest, and that over-investment can be measured by Tobin’s q-ratio2.  In this study they divided 
their sample between firms whose q-ratios are either less than or greater than one.  Firms who 
have q-ratios less than one are considered to be firms who are over-investing, and  firms who 
have q-ratios greater than one are considered to be value-maximizing. Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989) propose that a firm with a q-ratio less than one (over-investing firm) that increases its 
dividend payout would be reducing its free cash flows, and therefore it should be met with a 
greater stock price movement when compared to firms whose q-ratios are greater than one.  
Consistent with their hypothesis they find that firms with q-ratios less than one have a 
significantly larger response to increases in dividend policy than firms with q-ratios greater than 
one.     
 The Lang and Litzenberger (1989) study has a problem in that they simultaneously test 
two hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that firms with low/high q-ratios have high/low free cash 
                                                 
2 A firms’ q-ratio is calculated by taking the ratio of market value of equity divided by book value of equity.   
 21 
 
  
flows.  An example of a firm that wouldn’t fit this description would be Microsoft as it would be 
considered to have a high q-ratio and it also has huge amounts of free cash flow.  The second 
hypothesis is that firms with these different q-ratios have different reactions to a change in 
dividend policy.  What the Lang and Litzenberger (1989) paper really should report as its 
findings is that firms with lower growth prospects as measured by q-ratio have greater reactions 
to dividend increases than firms with larger growth prospects.  In order to truly test the 
hypothesis that free cash flows are an important determinant of how the market reacts to 
dividend changes, the free cash flows for the firm should be calculated directly instead of being 
represented by the firm’s q-ratio.   Once this is done, a test between firms with high and low free 
cash flows could be performed to see if there is a difference in market valuation. 
Lie (2000) studied the relationship between a firm’s excess funds and firm’s payout 
policy and found that dividend increasing firms had excess amounts of cash as compared to peer 
firms. This result is consistent with the idea that firms with the greatest potential for 
overinvestment decrease that potential by increasing their dividend.   
2.3  Dividend Clientele Models  
 Dividend clientele models are based on the assumption that firms can attract certain 
investors by modifying their existing payout policy.  A dividend clientele is defined as a set of 
investors who are attracted to stocks that have their preferred dividend policy.  This is usually 
based on their tax and/or liquidity constraints.  If a firm tries to attract shareholders that prefer 
capital gains the firm would lower dividend payments and increase share repurchases, or if the 
firm wanted to attract clientele that preferred dividends it would do the reverse. 
 Not very much empirical work or research has been devoted to this topical area.  This can 
be partially attributable to a paper written by Black and Scholes (1974).  In this paper they argue 
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that in equilibrium, a firm cannot change its share price by trying to appeal to a different 
dividend clientele.  They argue this because a change in dividend policy has two offsetting 
effects: one clientele group now finds the stock more attractive while another dividend clientele 
group finds the stock less attractive.  This results in a change in equilibrium, but the firm is still 
in equilibrium as it was before the dividend change, therefore the value of the firm remains 
unchanged. 
 That being said, dividend clienteles cannot be ignored.  Many institutions face constraints 
(either self imposed or regulated) that require them to hold dividend-paying stocks.  Mike 
O’Neill (CFO of Bank of America) has said, “We’ve got a lot of institutional investors, and a 
number of them continue to have dividend requirements that we just try to meet.  Many of our 
institutional investors will not invest in a company that does not have at least a 2% dividend 
yield. . . We think there is a value to having a broad investor base.”3
 Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) propose a dividend theory based on tax clienteles.  
This model assumes the following: 1) different investors are taxed differently and have different 
incentives to do their own due diligence; and 2) dividends are one way of attracting institutions.  
The first assumption illustrates the differences between institutions and other investors.  
Institutions such as pension funds, university endowment funds, and other non-profit groups are 
mostly tax exempt. The relative tax advantage of institutions as compared to other investors 
makes dividend paying firms a better purchase for them.  Allen et al. (2000)  propose that these 
institutions have greater incentives to research a firm than small investors do.  Institutional 
holdings can act as a signal to the average investor of firm quality, and institutions can also 
decrease agency costs by selling large blocks of shares to corporate raiders and be actively 
involved with corporate governance.   
                                                 
3 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Summer 1997, p. 57 
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 Their second assumption is reasonable because many institutional charters specify that 
securities must pay a dividend in order to be considered for an institution’s portfolio.  This 
preference stems from the Prudent Man Rule, which states that a fiduciary must “observe how 
men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage to their own affairs, not in regard to 
speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable 
income as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.”4   
 Allen et al. (2000) specify two models in their paper.  The first model is based on 
signalling. It concludes that high quality firms attract institutional investors by paying dividends, 
and that institutional ownership acts as a signal to uninformed investors.  It also concludes that 
bad firms dislike attracting institutional investors (because their bad qualities might be revealed) 
and therefore do not pay dividends.  There are obvious weaknesses with this theory as many top 
performing firms have not paid dividends while maintaining high institutional ownership.  The 
second model is based on agency costs.  In this model, dividends attract institutional investors 
who ensure that the firm will be run for the benefit of shareholders and not management.  Both 
models rely on firms purchasing the benefit of institutional ownership through dividends.   
 There is conflicting research regarding the association between dividend policy and 
institutional ownership. Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002) find a positive link between dividend 
policy and institutional ownership.  They show that the dividend payout ratio is significantly 
higher for firms with more than 5% institutional ownership in the UK.  The UK was chosen 
because dividends have greater tax advantages for institutions than they do in the US.  Thus, the 
UK might give more pronounced results and be a better country to test for tax clientele affects.  
Dhaliwal, Erickson, and Trezevant (1998) also believe that dividends have a positive effect on 
                                                 
4 The fundamental principle for professional money management, stated by Judge Samuel Putnum in 1830, quoted 
from Standards of Practice Handbook 1999 by the Association of Investment Management (AIMR) 
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institutional ownership as they examine institutional shareholdings around dividend initiation 
dates and found that 80% of firms experience increases in institutional shareholdings over the 
three to nine months following a dividend initiation.   
Michaely Thaler and Womack (1995) try to identify clientele effects by looking at the 
volume that surrounds dividend initiations and omissions.  They propose that if dividend 
initiations/omissions cause a shift in the clientele, that the common share  turnover rate should 
increase surrounding these announcements.  They find that the increase in volume from day -3 to 
+3 (day 0 being the event day) is minor and that there isn’t any significant increase in volume 
outside of this event window.  One plausible flaw in their methodology is that the shift in 
clientele is gradual without any noticeable increase in volume.   
Another method to explore the clientele effect that they used was to look at the change in 
institutional holdings of stocks prior to and after an omission of a dividend.  This is a smaller 
sample than the previous method because they were limited to the data available in the Standard 
and Poor’s Stock Guide.  The average institutional holdings (3 year average) was 30.0% prior to 
the omission, and the post 3 year average was 30.9%.  This gives further evidence that the 
dividend omissions do not produce dramatic changes in ownership. 
One thing that has not been studied with regards to institutional ownership and dividend 
policy is to see if investors place as much importance on a firm’s dividend policy that have high 
institutional ownership as compared to firms that have low institutional ownership.  We expect a 
difference in investors’ attitude towards these two types of firms if institutional ownership acts as 
a signal of firm quality and an effective measure to mitigate agency problems. Specifically, one 
would expect that an investor would value a dividend more greatly from a firm that had lower 
institutional ownership as compared to a firm with high institutional ownership, ceteris paribus. 
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2.4  Behavioural Finance Explanations for Dividends 
Much of economic and financial theory is based on the assumption that individuals act 
rationally and consider all available information in the decision making process. However, 
researchers have uncovered a surprisingly large amount of evidence that disputes this. 
Behavioural finance is a field of study which attempts to better understand this evidence and 
explain how emotions and cognitive limitations can explain these results.  I will be addressing 
specifically how investor’s behaviour towards risk and return may help to explain an investor’s 
desire for cash dividends. 
The first theory that needs to be addressed is “An Economic Theory of Self-Control” by 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981).  In this theory they assume that an individual has two internalized 
conflicting agents: a farsighted planner and a myopic doer.  The planner is concerned with 
lifetime utility, and the doer is only concerned with immediate consumption.  The planner has to 
try and exert some sort of power over the doer so the doer does not consume all of the assets in 
the current period.  Utility is maximized between the two conflicting agents when the loss of 
utility by decreasing current consumption is equal to the gain in utility by having extra future 
consumption available.   
This theory of self control is built upon by Shefrin and Statman (1984) in which they 
describe situations where investors prefer to receive cash dividends rather than capital gains.  
Standard finance theory states that investors should be indifferent between capital gains and 
dividends in the absence of transaction costs and taxes.  Shefrin and Statman (1984) find that 
money is not a homogeneous item, and that the source of and future use of money can help 
determine how it is used.  They determine that individuals use many rules of thumb to assist 
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them in their financing decisions, and these rules of thumb do not necessarily imply maximizing 
consumption.   
A rule of thumb that Shefrin and Statman (1984) propose that investors use is to spend or 
consume dividends and not touch the capital.  This rule would stop the myopic doer from over 
consuming in the current period by selling too much.  This rule also limits the amount of will 
power that the planner has to exert on the doer, along with the potential damage for not exerting 
enough will power.  Another rule of thumb not discussed by Shefrin and Statman (1984) is the 
Prudent Man Rule already discussed. 
Another relevant theory postulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) is the theory of 
regret.  Kahneman and Tversky (1982) studied individual’s reactions to the following two 
hypothetical settings: 
1) You take $600 received as dividends (which could have been reinvested with no 
transaction costs) and use the money to purchase a television set; or 
2) You sell $600 (with no transaction costs) worth of stock and use the proceeds to 
purchase a television set. 
After the purchase of the TV, the stock rises significantly.  If dividends and capital gains 
are perfect substitutes for each other, than there shouldn’t be any difference in the levels of regret 
between the two cases.  However, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) find that the stock sale option 
causes more regret.  Shefrin and Statman (1984) argue that consumption from dividends may be 
preferred to consumption from capital for people who are averse to regret.  This means that 
capital gains and dividends cannot be treated as perfect substitutes5.  Regret aversion can cause 
                                                 
5 In the following section on dividends and share repurchases are treated as perfect substitutes for.  As shown by this 
research, this assumption does not always hold.   
 27 
 
  
people to use the same rule of thumb that was discussed earlier under the theory of self control 
where investors consume out of dividends and won’t sell any of the capital. 
Thaler (1983) discusses how gains and losses are segregated.  He believes that people 
like to ‘savour’ their gains, which leads to people keeping track of them separately so they can 
each be enjoyed individually.  He likens it to wrapping Christmas presents separately in order to 
experience the pleasure of opening each gift individually.  Suppose an investor purchases a stock 
and after the purchase the stock price goes down.  Thaler (1983) proposes that the dividend is 
treated as a silver lining to the price drop and it helps to console the investor.  If the stock goes 
up, the dividend serves as an added benefit to the price increase.  In either case, the investor is 
able to get an extra benefit by having the dividend accounted for separately from the capital 
gain/loss.  
It is important to realize that investors’ perceptions of risk and return can change as time 
passes.  These changes might occur because of experience, age, knowledge and a host of other 
reasons.  Because the risk/return profile of the stock market is a function of all those who 
participate in it, as time passes, the aggregate view of this profile may change as investors will 
have new experiences and more knowledge.  As this happens, it is possible that the market will 
alter how it reacts to a dividend increase.    
2.5  Share Repurchases and Dividend Policy 
 The previous models and research for the most part discussed and treated dividend policy 
and share repurchases as two separate and distinct events; this however is not the case.  Share 
repurchases and dividend policy are each part of a firm’s larger payout policy, which can include 
one method at the exclusion of the other or pursue both methods simultaneously.   
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Lucas and McDonald (1998) solve this dilemma with a model that incorporates both 
dividends and share repurchases.  This model describes an adverse selection process of share 
repurchases.  This happens when a firm repurchases its shares at a premium to the current market 
price.  Most literature treats this as a positive event, but the authors propose that this hurts non-
tendering shareholders as it dilutes their holdings.  The resulting equilibrium in their model 
results from minimizing the higher tax costs of dividends and the adverse selection costs of share 
repurchases.  In this model firms in equilibrium with cash to distribute will pay a small dividend 
and use the remainder of the cash to repurchase shares.  Firms send stronger signals with larger 
repurchases. The costly dividend reduces the dilution to current shareholders by decreasing the 
share price, and therefore the premium paid on the share repurchase.  This decreases the cost of 
payout policy to the non-tendering shareholders, whom management should be most concerned 
with as they are the shareholders following the repurchase. 
 Brennan and Thakor (1990) also propose a model that considers both share repurchases 
and dividends.  This model is based on information asymmetries that exist amongst the investors 
in the firm; specifically, some investors through their own due diligence have acquired more 
information about the firm than others.  This information allows those investors to make better 
decisions when the firm decides to pursue a share repurchase.  The informed investors will 
tender the stock when the repurchase price exceeds the stock’s true value, and will keep their 
holdings when the tender price is less than this value.  In either case, the uninformed investor is 
worse off when the firm uses a share repurchase to distribute excess cash.  A dividend policy 
allows all investors to receive an equal or pro rata amount of the firm’s profit and the informed 
investors are not able to take advantage of their superior information.  As a result, the 
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uninformed investors prefer dividends to repurchases assuming that the tax burden of dividends 
is not too large, and the informed investor always prefers share repurchases. 
 In the previous section on signalling, a firm’s dividend policy acted as a signal to 
uninformed investors.  Because share repurchases and dividends are each part of a firms total 
payout policy, it is possible that share repurchases can signal the same information that dividends 
do about a firm’s prospects.  Comment and Jarrell (1991) propose that share repurchase 
programs that serve as the best signal are those that increase the amount of risk the firm’s 
managers assume through the repurchase.  Assuming that managers do not tender their shares 
during a repurchase period, they suggest that the manager’s risk increases when:  1) the initial 
holdings of management are large; 2) the greater the offer premium over the current price; and 3) 
the larger fraction of equity sought in the offering. 
There are three types of share repurchases that are used in the market: 1) Dutch-Auction; 
2) Fixed-Price; and 3) Open-Market.  In a Dutch auction repurchase a firm solicits offers from its 
shareholders, and then offers the lowest price needed in order to get the required number of 
shares sought in the offer.  A fixed price offer has a fixed number of shares being sought at a 
fixed price. The offer price is higher than the current market price and is usually at a 20-25% 
premium.  An open market program has the company buying the shares on the exchange for a 
variety of prices over an extended period of time.  Because the methods of these repurchases are 
different, it is expected that they will give different signals to the market. 
 Comment and Jarrell (1991) study the effectiveness of the signals that the different 
repurchase methods may give.  They propose that the fixed price tender offers will dominate 
both open market repurchases and Dutch auction offers.  They hypothesize this because fixed 
price tender offers release more information (specific price and amount of shares) by corporate 
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insiders.  Both Dutch auction tender and open market repurchases rely on the price discovery 
process of the market, and management never specifies what it thinks the stock is worth.  False 
signalling can occur with fixed price offers when the premium offered over the current stock 
price is not maintained after the repurchase is completed.  This cost represents a dividend paid to 
tendering shareholders (as they received more for the stock than what it was worth) that is paid 
by the non-tendering shareholders.   
 They find that each repurchase program is associated with above average returns on the 
announcement day.  Abnormal returns are 11%, 8%, and 2% for the fixed price, Dutch auction, 
and open market repurchases respectively.  This shows that the market values fixed price tender 
offers more than the other methods, and they propose this because it gives more information to 
the market than the other methods do.  There is also evidence that the repurchase premium is 
larger (meaning a greater signal) when the recent performance of the stock has been poor.  
Comment and Jarrell (1991) note that most of the buy back activity is through Dutch auctions 
and open market transactions, and conclude that other market factors are important and help 
determine which repurchase method firms choose. 
 The primary benefit of a share repurchase over a dividend is that investors can defer taxes 
on their investments until they want to assume the tax burden.  DeAngelo (1991) discusses this 
dilemma and assumes that tax deferral and consumption deferral are supplied goods.  The 
implication for this model is that if firms adopt low payout policies to take advantage of tax 
deferral, the market will be over supplied with future consumption.  This excess supply of future 
consumption causes the current market prices to react and brings the stock market back to 
equilibrium.  This equilibrium is reached even if investors are allowed to borrow or lend to 
rearrange their personal consumption because such transactions wouldn’t affect the aggregate 
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level of consumption.  This model helps explain why firms do not exclusively use share 
repurchases in spite of its tax advantages.   
 Just as firms can use share repurchases instead of dividends as a signal, firms can also use 
share repurchases to mitigate agency costs.  In order to study the differences between share 
repurchases and dividends, a number of studies have been performed that analyze the cash flows 
of firms surrounding these events.  Lie (2000) finds that all firms who increase their payout 
policy in a given year have increased cash flows prior to the announcement.  Firms that pay a 
special dividend or pursue a share repurchase program have incurred large, non recurring cash 
flows prior to the announcement and have cash flows that revert to the mean once the payout has 
been completed.  Firms that increase their regular dividend have increases in operating cash 
flows that continue after the dividend has been increased.  Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 
(2000) have similar findings but have two additional conclusions.  They find that repurchasing 
firms have more volatile cash flows before and after the distribution, and also find that firms 
repurchase stock following poor stock market performance and increase dividends following 
good stock market performance.    
 Both Lie (2000) and Jagannathan et al. (2000) show that firms are able to maintain 
financial flexibility by distributing excess funds with a share repurchase or special dividend 
instead of increasing their regular dividend.  This confirms the work of Lintner (1956) who 
proposed that firms only increase dividends once cash flows have permanently increased.  
Jagannathan et al. (2000) found that firms increase their dividends more during economic peaks 
and decrease them during economic downturns.  They also found that repurchases account for 
most of the year-to-year variation in a firm’s total payout. 
 32 
 
  
 Guay and Harford (2000) perform a similar analysis to both Lie (2000) and Jagannathan 
et al. (2000) but they also examined the stock price reaction to both share repurchases and 
dividend increases.  Guay and Harford (2000) hypothesize that dividend increases will send a 
better signal to the market than share repurchases as dividends represent an increase to 
permanent earnings.  Their hypothesis predicts that dividends and share repurchases give 
different signals regarding future cash flows.  They find evidence to support this as the stock 
price reactions to announcements of dividend increases are significantly greater than the 
reactions to share repurchases.  Also, in addition to previous studies that focused on comparing 
cash flows prior to and after a firm’s distribution, they compare the cash flows of firms who 
change distributions to a control group that does not change its annual payout.  They find that 
operating cash flows are similar between the control group and firms who engage in one time 
payouts (share repurchases and special dividends), and are different between the control group 
and firms that increase regular dividends.   
 As investors have begun to realize the advantages of using different forms of payout, it is 
likely that they have changed the way they value dividends both as a signal and as a way to 
decrease agency costs.  That being said, dividends and share repurchases cannot be treated as 
perfect substitutes for each other as was outlined in section 2.4.   
2.6  Firm’s Dividend Behaviour Through Time 
Fama and French (2001) studied dividend behaviour of firms from 1926-1999 and find 
that the tendency for a firm to pay dividends is on the decline.  In 1978, the proportion of non-
financial and non-utility firms that paid a dividend was 66.5%, and this has steadily declined to 
20.8% in 1999. 
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Fama and French (2001) study this pattern and try to identify the cause of such a dramatic 
shift in the amount of firms paying dividends.  They find through logit regressions that dividend- 
paying firms tend to share the following three common characteristics relative to non-dividend-
paying firms: higher profitability, fewer investment opportunities, and larger size.  They show 
that newly listed firms from 1978 onward tend to be smaller, unprofitable ones with many 
investment opportunities. 
This does not explain all of the reduction though.  They find that there is a lower 
propensity to pay dividends among all firms regardless of size, investment opportunities and 
profitability.  There has been an increased number of share repurchases over this time period but 
it is argued that since share repurchases are primarily the territory of dividend payers, that this 
cannot explain the decline in the percentage of firms that pay dividends.  They contend that the 
primary effect of increases in share repurchases is to increase the already high cash payouts of 
dividend payers. 
They believe that some, but not all of the possible reasons for such a decline are: 1) lower 
transaction costs for selling stocks enabling investors to create home made dividends; 2) larger 
stock option holdings for managers who prefer capital gains to dividends; and 3) better corporate 
governance that lowers the importance of dividends in controlling potential agency conflicts.   
A study over the same time period was performed by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 
(2003) who find that aggregate real dividends increased over the time period of the Fama and 
French (2001) study.  At first this seems to contradict Fama and French (2001), but DeAngelo et 
al (2003) find that the reduction in dividend payers occurs primarily among firms who paid very 
small dividends, and that the increase in real dividends from the firms that pay large dividends 
dominates the effect of losing many firms that pay these small dividends.  Combining the 
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findings of these two studies results in the conclusion that there has been an increase in the 
concentration of dividend payers.  
 Many people have assumed that share repurchases have displaced special dividends in a 
firm’s corporate payout policy.  DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) study special 
dividends over time and conclude that special dividends have disappeared because they were 
close substitutes for regular dividends, not because they were displaced by the increased use of 
share repurchases.  They reach this conclusion for a number of reasons.  First, they show that 
most firms who paid special dividends paid them on a regular basis.  Firms who paid special 
dividends did so on an average of once every other year.  Second, they also show that when firms 
reduced special dividends they simultaneously increased regular dividends.  Third, their data 
shows that the disappearance of special dividends coincides with all firms adopting uniform 
dividend policies that pay quarterly.  Finally, firms were more likely to increase their regular 
dividends once they stopped paying special dividends.   
They believe that share repurchases did not displace special dividends because they 
cannot find any correlation between the decline in special dividends and the increased use of 
share repurchases.  The decline in special dividends started prior to the rise of share repurchases, 
and if share repurchases replaced special dividends, DeAngelo et al. (2000) argue that 
replacement cannot explain the gap between the two events.  Also, firms who once paid special 
dividends are no more inclined to start a share repurchase program than firms who never paid 
such a dividend. 
One potential explanation of the change in firms’ dividend behaviour is that fewer firms 
are paying dividends because investors do not want them to.  This idea has not yet been 
addressed in the literature and is one of the hypotheses to be tested.  Also, no one has studied 
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whether the market reacts to dividend increases differently between bull and bear markets.  An 
analysis of this type using current data was not possible until recently because of the long bull 
market that started in 1983 and ended in approximately 2000.  It is quite possible that dividends 
are treated differently during bear and bull markets as these varying market conditions present 
different paradigms in which to make judgments through.     
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL ISSUES AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 This chapter introduces the hypotheses and discusses the motivation and the theoretical 
arguments that support each.  In total there are eight hypotheses.   
 Hypothesis 1 deals with the possibility that the market reaction to dividend increases has 
changed over time in a consistent and noticeable pattern. It postulates that the reaction has 
weakened, and if true, it suggests that investors’ demand for dividends has decreased over time. 
This is motivated by the observation of Fama and French (2001) that firms exhibit declining 
propensity to pay dividends.  
 Hypothesis 2 deals with the possibility that the market reaction to dividend increases 
varies depending on the conditions of the market. In particular, the possibility that investors treat 
dividends differently in bear markets than they do in bull markets is tested.  
 Hypotheses 3-8 examine respectively the relation between the market reaction to 
dividend increases and institutional ownership, debt load, free cash flow, liquidity, Tobin’s q-
ratio, and trading volume. Previous studies suggest these variables may explain the differences in 
the market reactions to dividend increases.  Hypothesis 3 is motivated by the argument that high 
institutional ownership reduces agency costs and works as a signal of firm quality to the market. 
In the presence of institutional ownership, the role of dividends to act as a signalling device and 
reduce agency costs is likely dampened.  So it is postulated that the size of institutional 
ownership helps explain cross-sectional differences in the impact of dividend increases.  
 Hypothesis 4 states that the level of debt in the capital structure can explain differences in 
the market reaction to dividend increases. In theory, debt holders monitor managers to ensure 
compliance with debt covenants. This monitoring may reduce agency costs. 
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 Hypothesis 5 is motivated by the argument that free cash flows are positively related to 
agency costs.  Dividend increases by firms that have large free cash flows would be a strong 
signal to the market that managers are not interested in consuming perquisites or empire 
building. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 postulates that the market reaction to dividend increases is 
more pronounced for firms with larger free cash flows.  
 Hypothesis 6 is motivated by the argument that the decline in the propensity of firms to 
pay dividends is due to decline in transaction costs and to the ease with which investors can 
create home-made dividends.   It is believed that the more liquid a firm is, the easier it is to 
create a home-made dividend in it.  This should result in a smaller market reaction to dividend 
increases for more liquid firms.   
 Hypothesis 7 deals with the role of the Tobin’s q-ratio in explaining the market reaction 
to dividend increases. Traditionally, a high q-ratio is associated with firms that have high growth 
opportunities.   Yet, previous studies have used the q-ratio to proxy for agency costs instead.  In 
this study, agency costs are accounted for directly by computing the free cash flow for each firm.  
The q-ratio is  then tested to see if it is still an important factor in determining the market’s 
reaction to a dividend increase.   
 Hypothesis 8 tests whether the market reaction to dividend increases is related to the 
increase in trading volume following the announcements of the dividend increase. While the 
relation between volume and share price has been tested in dividend omission and deletion 
studies, it has never been tested for using a sample that focuses on dividend increases. 
 As a note, hypotheses 7 and 8 were developed as the research progressed on this thesis.    
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3.1  Market Reaction Over Time 
 Previous studies clearly suggest that the behaviour of firms in regard to dividends has 
changed over time. Fama and French (2001) show that firms in general have a decreasing 
propensity to pay dividends. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000, 2003) report that on 
average that firms who paid dividends in the past are now paying larger ones.  In addition, they 
find that special dividends have disappeared.   
 There is little research regarding the possibility that investors may have changed their 
behaviour towards dividends.  Some of the possible reasons for this change would be better 
corporate governance, more timely releases of new information, and better informed investors.  
These market improvements may have reduced the significance of dividends as a way to reduce 
agency costs or signal firm quality.  If these functions are no longer needed, it is possible that the 
importance of dividends has declined.   
 Given this literature and reasoning, the following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 1: The market reaction to dividend increases is declining over time 
3.2 Market Reaction During Different Market Conditions 
It is rational to expect that investors are concerned about total returns, the sum of capital 
gains return and dividend yield.  Previous studies suggest there are several reasons why investors 
may react differently to dividend increases based on market conditions. Thaler (1983) suggests 
that investors may treat dividends as a silver lining when capital gains return is negative. On the 
other hand, when capital returns are positive he states that dividends may be treated by investors 
as an added bonus. Previous studies in behavioural finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984), 
propose that investors do not act consistently in all circumstances.  They find that money is not a 
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homogenous item, and that its source can determine how the money is spent.  They find that 
investors treat money differently if it is received as a capital gain or dividend. 
 If this is true, then it is possible that market conditions can help determine the value that 
investors place on different components of return.   
It may also be the case that market participants place greater importance on the 
possibilities that dividends signal private information and reduce agency costs in bear markets.  
Signalling could take on a greater role in such a market as many firms see decreasing share 
prices without a corresponding decrease in future outlook.  Also, agency costs could be seen to 
be greater in a bear market as there is a likely decreased amount of positive NPV projects to 
invest in.   
This leads to the second hypothesis to be tested: 
Hypothesis 2: The market reaction to dividend increases will be greater during bear markets than 
in bull markets. 
3.3 Institutional Ownership    
Allen, Bernard, and Welch (2000) propose a model in which dividends serve to attract 
institutional investors.  These investors have a greater incentive and ability to research a firm’s 
future cash flows than the marginal investor. They also have better abilities to monitor 
management which reduces the potential for waste.  Allen et al. (2000) also contend that 
institutions serve as a signal to the average investor.  As dividend theories propose that dividends 
serve to act as a signal and reduce agency costs, dividends are likely to be redundant in firms that 
have high institutional ownership.   
 If this is true, it would be expected that such firms would have smaller reactions to a 
dividend increase.  This has not yet been tested.  Previous tests on institutional ownership have 
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primarily focused on dividend initiations and omissions.  For example Dhaliwal, Erickson and 
Trezevant (1998) find that institutional holdings increase after a firm initiates a dividend.  
 The relationship between a firm’s institutional holdings and its increase in dividend leads 
to the third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  Firms with high institutional ownership will have smaller market reactions to 
dividend increases.   
3.4 The Level of Debt 
Jensen (1986) argues that debt holders reduce agency costs as they monitor managers to 
insure the firm is complying with debt covenants. Covenants are usually designed to restrict 
management’s ability to take actions that may transfer value from bondholders to common 
shareholders. A restriction on dividend levels increases is often one of these covenants. 
Therefore, a dividend increase by a firm that has a high debt ratio indicates the firm has received 
approval from debt holders that it is capable of paying a higher dividend.  This approval may act 
as a signal to the market, and if this is the case, the market should react in a positive way.   
In contrast, interest payments may be viewed as a substitute for dividend payments in that 
they reduce the discretionary cash flows available to managers. According to this view, a firm 
that is highly indebted presents managers with fewer opportunities to consume perks and pursue 
empire building. If this argument is true, then shareholders will value a dividend increase less in 
firms with high debt levels because discretionary cash flows are already reduced.  In this case, a 
dividend increase may be seen as of no value to shareholders.  As a result, the reaction to a 
dividend increase may be insignificant or negative.  This is called the agency effect.   
These arguments lead to the fourth hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: The market reaction to dividend increases is stronger for firms that have high debt 
ratios if the signal effect outweighs the agency effect.  If the agency effect 
outweighs the signal effect, then it is expected that the market reaction will be 
negative to firms who increase their dividend.   
3.5 The Level of Free Cash Flows  
One of the major themes in the dividend literature is that dividends reduce the potential 
for agency costs by reducing the amount of cash available to management. Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) find that firms with q-ratios less than one have a larger reaction to dividend 
increases than firms with q-ratios greater than one. They suggest that the market reactions are 
directly related to the amount of cash flows available to managers. Higher reactions should be 
associated with firms that have high cash flows. In their view, the levels of cash flows available 
to managers are inversely related to a firm’s q-ratio.     
 In this study, free cash flows are calculated for each firm in the sample. The variable that 
represents cash flows is included in the regressions to test the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Dividend increases that are announced by firms that have large amounts of free 
cash flows will generate stronger market reactions than dividend increases that are 
announced by firms that have small amounts of free cash flow. 
3.6 Market Liquidity of Common Shares 
This research question stems from Fama and French (2001). They argue that transaction 
costs have decreased over time and information is cheaper to acquire and readily available. They 
observe that the propensity to pay dividends dropped significantly in 1978 and they partially 
attribute this drop to the introduction of negotiated commissions three years earlier. They 
conclude that it is now easier for investors to periodically sell a small amount of their holdings to 
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create home-made dividends. Thus, investors may not need the quarterly dividend distributions 
to receive regular cash flows.  It is proposed that it is easier to create these home-made dividends 
the more liquid a firm is.   There is no prior research that investigates the relation between the 
liquidity of a firm’s common shares and its dividend policy. 
 These arguments lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Firms with greater liquidity will have smaller market reactions to a dividend 
increase than firms with low liquidity   
3.7 The Firm’s Q-ratio  
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) find that firms with q-ratios less than one have greater 
reactions to dividend increases than firms whose q-ratios are greater than one.  They argue that 
the q-ratio is inversely related to the level of free cash flows available to firms. Based on these 
arguments, they justify their conclusions on the basis that dividend increases associated with low 
(high) Tobin’s q-ratios are observed because these firms have high (low) free cash flows. 
 In this thesis, free cash flows are calculated directly from the publicly available financial 
statements of the sample firms. The data shows no relationship between the firm’s free cash flow 
and its q-ratio.  This raises the question of whether the q-ratio is still an important factor in 
determining the market’s reaction to a dividend increase. Traditionally, the Tobin’s q-ratio is 
used as a proxy for the growth opportunities of the firm. These arguments lead to the following 
hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 7: Dividend increases by firms that have low growth opportunities produce stronger 
market reaction than dividend increases by firms that have high growth 
opportunities. 
3.8 The Change in Volume 
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 Previous studies have been done on volume changes and dividends. The primary purpose 
of these studies is to identify clientele effects. In particular, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 
(1995) try to determine if there are volume changes surrounding dividend initiations and 
omissions, which would indicate clienteles shifting into and out of those stocks.  They find that 
there are only minor changes in volume surrounding the omission or deletion dates.  Without 
significant results, they propose that the clientele effect may take place gradually and thus it 
would be undetectable using current techniques. 
 In this study, it is proposed that volume changes surrounding the dividend increases can 
explain some of the variations in the market’s reaction to these increases.  This leads to the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8: The market’s reaction to a dividend increase is positively associated with the 
change in volume following the announcement  
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
  This chapter reviews the sample requirements and the methodology used to test the 
hypothesis.  Section 4.1 describes the sample and the conditions under which a firm may be 
included in it. Section 4.2 explains the procedures that are followed to collect the data related to 
each firm in the sample. In particular, it explains how the firm’s free cash flows, debt to equity 
ratio, the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutions, common share turnover, q-ratio, 
and volume changes are measured. 
 Section 4.3 describes what is meant by the market reaction to dividend increases and 
explains the procedure by which this reaction is measured. Essentially, the market reaction is 
defined as the percentage abnormal return divided by the percentage increase in dividends.   
 Section 4.4 specifies how the hypotheses are tested.  Section 4.4.1 presents the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression model that is used to test most of the hypotheses stated in 
Chapter 3. Section 4.4.2 describes the process by which the second hypothesis is tested.  This 
hypothesis is concerned with the possibility that the market’s reaction to an increase in dividends 
during a bull market is different from the reaction during a bear market.  Section 4.4.3 gives the 
details of the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression which is also used in the analysis.  Section 4.5 
briefly discusses the limitations borne from the methodology used and some underlying 
assumptions. 
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4.1  Sample Requirements 
This thesis studies the behaviour of stocks in the United States surrounding 
announcements of dividend increases. The study covers the twenty-year period from 1985 to 
2004 inclusive. This time period was chosen for two reasons. First, it coincides with the sample 
period of Fama and French (2001) who identified the firm’s declining propensity to pay 
dividends. Second, some data required for this thesis are retrieved from the Compustat North 
American Database. This database provides information for the most recent 20 years.   
In order to be included in the sample, a firm must: 
1) Be listed on one of the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX exchanges,  
2) Have daily return data available from CRSP; 
3) Have increased its quarterly dividend by at least 10%; 
4) Have paid no special dividends and made no quarterly dividend increases during the 
previous 6 months; 
5) Not be a utility firm as determined by the firm’s SIC code; 
6) Be paying dividends in U.S. dollars without any withholding taxes on the dividend; 
7) Have had no stock splits during the month that precedes the dividend increase 
announcement; and 
8) Have the dividend declaration date and the increase of the dividend recorded in the 
annual publication of Moody’s Annual Dividend Record from 1985-1998 and in 
Mergent’s Annual Dividend Record6 from 1999-2004. 
The sample requirements listed above resulted in a total of 919 total firms being included with 
2,303 different observations.   
4.2  Data Related to the Independent Variables  
                                                 
6 Moody’s changed the name of its publications from Moody’s to Mergent’s in 1999 
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 Information related to a number of variables is needed in order to carry out the analysis.  
The firm’s free cash flow, debt to equity ratio, and liquidity are obtained from the Compustat 
North American Database.  Information related to institutional holdings is obtained from the 
Thomson Financial Database. 
Free Cash Flow 
Free cash flows are important to a firm because they represent the resources that are 
available for discretionary use by management.  Some of these uses could enhance shareholder 
value such as positive NPV projects, dividend payments, debt reduction, and share repurchases.  
However, it is also possible for management to spend discretionary money on negative NPV 
projects such as perquisites and pet projects.  For this reason it is hypothesized that investors 
value dividends because it decreases the amount of money that managers may potentially waste.  
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) conclude that firms with larger free cash flows experience a larger 
abnormal return than firms with smaller free cash flows.  In their methodology they divide their 
sample into firms with q-ratios above and below one, and assume that firms with q-ratios less 
than one have larger free cash flows.  For this thesis, free cash flows are computed directly and 
then tested to see if the level of free cash flow has a significant relationship with the market’s 
reaction to a dividend increase. 
One of the problems associated with calculating free cash flow is that there is no single 
definition that is accepted by all financial professionals.  Most definitions7 result in a similar 
figure but there are slight differences in how this figure is calculated.  For example, one 
definition might start with net income and another might start with operating income prior to 
depreciation expenses. The first definition will add back depreciation and the second will add 
                                                 
7 For examples see “The Analysis and Use of Financial Statements” by White, Sondhi and Fried (1997) or 
“Investment Valuation” by Damodaran (1996). 
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income from non-recurring items. Eventually the two approaches produce similar results.  The 
definition of free cash flow which is used in this thesis is:  
FCF = NI + DEP – DIV – CAPX ± Δ NWC ± DEF TAX ± NET DEBT         Eq. 2 
where FCF    - Free Cash Flow 
 NI    - Net Income 
 DEP    - Depreciation 
 DIV   - Cash Dividends Paid to Shareholders 
 CAPX    - Capital Expenditures 
  Δ NWC  - Changes in Net Working Capital 
  DEF TAX - Deferred Taxes 
  NET DEBT - Net New Debt 
Lie (2000) also tried to find a relationship between a firm’s cash flow and abnormal 
returns when a firm increases its dividend but was not able to do so.  He used a different measure 
of cash flow and abnormal returns.  His definition of cash flow was called ‘undistributed cash 
flow’ which is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes 
and dividends.  The definition presented here is more thorough as it includes all of Lie’s (2000) 
variables plus the cash flows that result from debt, deferred taxes, capital expenditures and 
changes in networking capital.  Lie’s (2000) definition of the dependent variable abnormal return 
is also different.  He used raw abnormal returns (as described in the next section) while the 
dependent variable used in this thesis is abnormal returns standardized by their dividend 
increase.   Thus, the abnormal return for a 10% dividend increase in Lie (2000) was treated the 
same as an abnormal return associated with 50% dividend increase.  The standardization is 
necessary because a larger increase in dividends should relate to a larger abnormal return.  
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Hopefully by making these changes I will be able to identify a relationship between dividend 
valuation and cash flows.   
The net income figure is the starting point for this measure and it represents the income 
or loss of a firm for a period.  It is determined as the sum of income from all sources minus all 
expenses and losses. Note that this net income measure includes the cash flows from 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations. Alternatively, these cash flows may be 
excluded to obtain the free cash flow from operations.  For this thesis all cash flows that are 
available to a manager are considered important as the cash can be used improperly regardless of 
how it was obtained.  The net income data used in this study are obtained directly from 
Compustat (mnemonic code is NI). 
Depreciation is a non-cash expense that reduces the cash flows a firm may report as net 
income. It is technically cash set aside for the purpose of replenishing depreciable assets. 
Therefore, depreciation is added back to net income to obtain the actual amount of cash available 
to managers.  The depreciation amount is obtained from the Compustat database (mnemonic 
code is DP). 
The amount of cash dividends paid to shareholders is subtracted from net income to 
obtain free cash flow.  It may be argued that cash paid as dividends should not be deducted as in 
theory dividend payments are discretionary and may be discontinued by management.  However, 
in practice dividend payments are not entirely discretionary and freely determined by 
management. It is well documented (for example see Lintner 1956) that dividends are smoothed 
over time and rarely cut. In extreme cases when cash resources are not enough, management will 
find other sources of capital to pay dividends rather than reduce or suspend them.  The amount of 
dividends paid is obtained from Compustat (mnemonic code is DV). 
 49 
 
  
Capital expenditures are subtracted from net income to find free cash flow. This is done 
as capital requirements need to be made to maintain the firm’s current productive capacity.  
There are two possible ways to estimate capital expenditures; these are historical cost 
depreciation and total capital expenditures made during a period.  If capital expenditures for a 
period equalled depreciation then this would nullify the depreciation expense that was previously 
added back.  As the depreciation expense is arbitrary, it would be nothing more than coincidence 
if it equalled the capital expenditures needed to maintain current capacity.  The second 
alternative relies on the capital expenditures a firm identifies on the cash flow statements 
(Compustat mnemonic code is CAPX).  This figure is generally regarded as the better choice and 
is therefore the method used here even though the discretionary capital expenditures are not 
distinguishable from necessary expenditures.  Ideally, necessary capital expenditures are not 
included in this calculation because managers do not have a choice regarding these expenditures, 
and the free cash flow measure tries to identify cash flows that management can make choices 
with. 
Changes in net working capital are needed to calculate free cash flow.  Net working 
capital for any given year is defined as current assets minus current liabilities.  Both of these are 
found directly from Compustat (mnemonic codes are ACT and LCT respectively).  What is 
important for the measurement of free cash flow is the change in net working capital from the 
previous year.  For example, an increase in current liabilities in one year while holding all else 
constant (except for a general asset account which matches the increase found in current 
liabilities) means that a firm has increased its assets through increasing liabilities. This is 
considered to be a source of or increase to cash.  The change of net working capital for the years 
1986-2004 is calculated by subtracting the previous year’s working capital from the current year.  
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If this calculation yields a positive number (current assets increased or current liabilities 
decreased or both) this means that the firm has decreased its cash flows, and the opposite is true 
if this number is negative.  This cannot be calculated for 1985 as the database does not extend 
past this year and hence the change from 1984 cannot be calculated.  For 1985, the average of the 
change in net working capital for the following five years is taken and used as an estimate.   
Deferred taxes are also needed to calculate free cash flow.  They are obtained from the 
statement of cash flows and it arises because of the different amortization methods used for 
accounting and taxation purposes.  To illustrate how this item arises, consider a company that 
elects to use an accelerated depreciation method for tax purposes and straight-line depreciation 
for accounting reports.  Since depreciation is larger in the earlier years for tax purposes, there are 
two consequences: 1) a tax deferral or savings in early years; and 2) a tax catch-up or expense in 
later years.  If a company experiences a tax deferral in a year this must be added to free cash 
flows because the company has an expense it deducted from net income that it did not outlay any 
cash for.  The opposite is also true if a firm has to pay a tax catch-up in any year.  Deferred taxes 
for a firm are reported as an annual item in the Compustat (mnemonic code of TXDC). 
The firm’s financing activities affect the amount of free cash available to managers. For a 
levered firm there is a possibility each year of retiring debt which would decrease the amount of 
cash available, and there is also the possibility that a firm might issue new debt which could 
increase the level of cash available8.  Thus, a firm that has a net increase in its borrowings means 
that the firm’s managers have more discretionary money on hand.  If this number is negative it 
implies that a firm has retired more debt in a year than it has issued.  This results in the firm’s 
management having less discretionary cash to spend and therefore it needs to be subtracted from 
                                                 
8 Issuing new debt might not increase cash on hand if it already has a specific purpose to be used for such as 
expanding operations.  In this situation the debt raised (increase to FCF) would cancel out the capital expenditures 
(decrease to FCF).   
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the rest of the free cash flow calculation.  Compustat has a mnemonic code of DLTR for the 
reduction in long term debt and DLTIS for the issuance of long term debt. Netting these two 
against each other gives us the last number needed to calculate free cash flow.   
Once the free cash flow for each company has been determined, we need to know what 
the free cash flow per share is as this is what shareholders are ultimately concerned with; this is 
similar to shareholders being concerned with earnings per share and not with total earnings.   The 
number of common shares outstanding is available from Compustat and has a mnemonic code of 
CSHO.  Therefore, the free cash flow measure is divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding to get free cash flow per share.  
Debt to Equity Ratio  
 One of the possible explanations for the decrease in firm’s propensity to pay dividends is 
that interest payments have begun to reduce the importance of dividend payments as explained 
by Jensen (1986) because interest payments may decrease agency costs and act as a signal of a 
high quality firm (both of which are theoretical reasons of why firms pay dividends).  The 
increase in debt load in the stock market is illustrated by the fact the average debt to equity ratio 
has risen in the Standard and Poor’s 500 from 47.3 in 1985 to 79.1 in 2004.  The debt to equity 
ratio is available from Compustat and has a mnemonic code of DCE.  Debt is classified as such 
an a firm’s balance sheet if it’s principal is due in more than one year.  Common equity includes 
total share capital and retained earnings.  
Liquidity  
Fama and French (2001) hypothesize that one of the possible reasons that fewer firms are 
paying dividends is that homemade dividends are easier to create, and these homemade 
dividends more adequately meet the needs of investors when compared to those that are paid by 
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the firm.   It follows from this that home-made dividends should be easier to create in firms that 
are more liquid.  For this thesis liquidity is measured by common share turnover; which is  
defined as the ratio of a firm’s annual number of common shares traded to the amount of 
common shares outstanding.  For example, a ratio of 2 would indicate that each share 
outstanding traded 2 times during the year.  This leads to common share turnover being the third 
data point collected.  This data is available from Compustat, with common shares outstanding 
and trading volume having mnemonic codes of CSHO and CSHTRF respectively. 
Institutional Ownership 
The fourth characteristic that needs to be gathered is the percentage of common shares 
outstanding that are owned by institutions, this is commonly referred to as institutional 
ownership.  As discussed in the literature review, institutional ownership might act either as a 
signal of firm quality or a potential way to mitigate agency problems.  Collecting this 
information will allow the relationship between institutional holdings and the markets reaction to 
dividend increases to be tested.  The data for institutional holdings is available from the 
Thomson Financial Database. 
Q-ratio   
The q-ratio is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity.  
A higher q-ratio is interpreted to mean that managers have earned higher rates of return.  The 
book value of equity is available from the Compustat (code of BVAL).  The market value of 
equity is also available from Compustat (code of MKTVAL).  The q-ratio is calculated by taking 
the ratio of these two numbers. 
Trading Volume Surrounding the Dividend Increase 
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This data is gathered from the CRSP database.  The increase in volume measure is 
defined as the excess volume that occurs after the dividend announcement has taken place when 
compared to volume over a similar time period prior to the announcement. This measure is also 
standardized by the average daily volume in order to get the abnormal volume on a percentage 
scale.  Three different volume measures are used; 10, 5 and 2 days.  The following steps are 
followed to obtain the variable that accounts for trading volume: 
1) find the mean volume for the specified number of days prior to the dividend 
change; 
2) find the mean volume for the specified number of days after the dividend change; 
3) find the difference between these two volumes; 
4) standardize this difference by the average volume for the time period.  
4.3  Methodology 
4.3.1  Determining the Market’s Reaction to a Dividend Increase 
 Previous studies, such as Pettit (1972), Charest (1978), and Allen and Michaely (2003) 
consider the abnormal returns following announcements of dividend increases. Their methods 
are followed in this study.  
In order to develop a measure of the market reaction, the first step is to calculate the 
abnormal return on the dividend declaration date.  For this the traditional event study 
methodology by Brown and Warner (1985) is used.  They suggest three ways to calculate an 
abnormal return.  For this study the OLS Market Model is used.  This method is chosen because 
Brown and Warner (1985) find that it outperforms the other models, and because it is the most 
common method referred to in the literature. 
 54 
 
  
This model assumes that the return on a security can be estimated using the relationship 
between the individual security’s return and the return on a market index.  Mathematically the 
relationship looks like the following: 
εβα titmiiti RR ,,, +×+=                                             Eq. 3 
where Ri,t –  the rate of return for the firm i at time t 
 αi  –  the intercept coefficient 
 βi  –  the coefficient representing the linear relationship between the firm i return and 
  the return on a market index 
 Rm,t –  the rate of return on a market index 
 εi,t –  the unsystematic component of the firm i’s return with the market return 
The parameter estimates above are estimated by regressing the daily returns of each firm 
on the daily returns of the S&P 500 stock index.  The estimation period of the model is from 250 
days prior to 1 day prior to the event day (declaration date).  These parameters are then used to 
calculate the abnormal return for the firm.  The abnormal return is calculated as follows: 
tmiititi RRA ,,,
^^
×−−= βα                                Eq. 4 
 
where Ai,t –  is the Abnormal Return of firm i at time t 
 Ri,t –  the rate of return for the firm i at time t 
   –  an estimate of the intercept coefficient 
iα
^
 –  an estimate of the coefficient representing the linear relationship between the firm 
i’s return and the return on a market index 
iβ
^
 Rm,t –  the rate of return on a market index 
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The abnormal return then needs to be tested for significance.  To do this, a t-statistic is 
calculated which also uses the methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985).  They state 
that the null hypothesis to be calculated is that the mean excess return on the event day is equal 
to zero.  The test statistic is the ratio of the event day mean excess return to its estimated standard 
deviation where the standard deviation is estimated from a time series of mean excess returns.  
Specifically this is done as follows: 
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T - The number or pre event-days 
N - The number of sample firms   
Brown and Warner (1985) state that if the tA  are normal, independent, and identically 
distributed, that the test statistic will be distributed as a students t-distribution.   
It is expected that most of the abnormal return will occur on the event (or declaration) 
day, but there is the possibility that the announcement effect of a dividend increase might be felt 
on the days surrounding it.  The days prior may be important because it is possible that 
information regarding the dividend increase may already be known by some market participants.  
It may also be important to examine the days immediately following as it may take time for 
investors to fully incorporate the new information.  As a result, the Cumulative Abnormal Return 
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(CAR) is also calculated to ensure that all of the announcement effect is captured.  The CAR is a 
multi-day event study that uses the estimates in equation 3 to calculate the abnormal return 
surrounding the event day.  Mathematically CAR looks like the following: 
∑+=
−=
=
kt
jt
tii ACAR ,                                                              Eq. 6 
where CARi  – is the Cumulative Abnormal Return of firm i 
 - j  –  the number of days prior to the event day 
 + k –  the number of event days succeeding the event day 
 Ai,t – the abnormal return for firm i on days – j through + k 
The multi-day event periods for this study are 5 days (-2,+2) and 3 days (-1,+1). 
Just as with the abnormal return calculation, the CAR needs to be tested for significance.  
To do this a similar t-statistic is calculated.  This new t-statistic is calculated as follows: 
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with T-1 degrees of freedom                              Eq. 7 
Because it can be expected that larger dividend increases will result in larger abnormal 
returns, once the abnormal return (or CAR) is calculated it needs to be standardized in order to 
facilitate comparison.  Abnormal returns are standardized by dividing them by the percentage 
increase of the firm’s dividend.  This step creates a measure that allows comparability among all 
firms.  Mathematically this measure looks like the following: 
ti
ti
ti P
CARA
D
,
,
,
)(=                                                            Eq. 8  
where Ai,t –  is the Abnormal Return of firm i at time t or the CAR of one of the multi-day 
  event studies 
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 Pi,t –  percentage increase of firm i’s dividend at time t 
 Di,t –  the unit of measure that gives us the abnormal return per percentage increase in 
  dividend for firm i   
If this step was not done, then all abnormal returns would be treated the same regardless 
of dividend increase.  For example, if two firms each had an abnormal return of 5% but one 
increased its dividend by 10% and the other by 20%, the raw abnormal return does not reflect the 
fact that the second firm increased its dividend by twice as much.   
4.3.2  Testing to See if the Market’s Reaction to a Dividend Increase is Declining with 
Time 
In order to test the hypotheses stated in chapter 3 regression analysis is used.  The first 
regression is a multi factor regression model with the abnormal return per unit of dividend 
increase (Di from equation 8 with the time index suppressed) as the dependent variable with time 
and the other firm specific factors as explained in chapter 3 as the independent variables. The 
regression equation for this is defined as follows: 
iD
^
 = +
^α  1
^β FCFi + D/E2
^β i + TURN3
^β i + INS4
^β i + Time + e5
^β i                              Eq. 9  
where  – an estimate of the abnormal return divided by percentage increase in iD
^
   dividend 
  –  an estimate of the intercept coefficient 
^α
 FCFi – the free cash flow of the firm 
  – an estimate of the slope coefficient for FCF; the expected sign of this 
coefficient is positive as firms with high FCF have greater agency costs, 
1
^β
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and thus a dividend will reduce these agency costs and be valued more for 
firms who have more of these costs 
 D/Ei – the Debt to Equity ratio of the firm 
  – an estimate of the slope coefficient for D/E; the expected sign of this 
coefficient is negative if the agency problem discussed for the FCF 
coefficient holds, if firm’s with high debt loads are signalling future 
prospects than the expected sign of this coefficient is positive 
2
^β
 TURNi – the common share turnover for the firm 
  – an estimate of the slope coefficient for TURN; the expected sign of this 
coefficient is negative as homemade dividends (selling small portions of 
stock) is easier to do with firms that have greater liquidity  
3
^β
 INS – the percentage institutional ownership of the firm’s outstanding shares 
  –  an estimate of the slope coefficient for INS; it is expected that this 
coefficient will be negative as institutional holdings potentially reduce 
agency costs and act as a signal of firm quality which are both potential 
reasons for a firm to pay a dividend and thus paying a dividend is 
redundant 
4
^β
 Time – a variable that represents the date of the dividend increase.  Firms in the 
first year of the sample are given a value of zero, firms in the second year 
of the sample are given a value of one, etc.  
  – an estimate of the slope coefficient for time; it is expected that this will be 
negative as investors have become more sophisticated and prefer other 
5
^β
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forms of payouts and because there are better forms of corporate 
governance  
   –  the estimate of the unsystematic component ie
Other factors are added to this base model, particularly a firm’s q-ratio and change in 
volume. As they were not part of the original ideas to be tested, they are not included in equation 
9.  
For this regression standard t-tests are used in order to determine significance.   
 As a summary, the following table shows the expected signs of the coefficients and the 
theories that predict these signs.  
Table 1 – Expected signs of the coefficients 
Coefficient Expected Sign Theory 
Free Cash Flow Positive Agency Costs 
Debt-to-Equity Negative/Positive Agency Costs/Signaling 
Turnover Negative Easier to create home made dividends 
Institutional Holdings Negative Signaling and Agency Costs 
Time Negative Decreasing importance of dividends 
  
4.3.3  Testing to see if there is a Difference in how the Market Reacts to a Dividend 
Increase in Bear vs. Bull Markets.   
 This section describes how to perform a test to see if the market’s reaction to a dividend 
increase depends on the chance the dividend increase occurred in a bull or bear market. In order 
to do this a dummy variable needs to be introduced.  Dummy variables are used when qualitative 
variables such as gender, geographic regions, or time periods are tested.  In this case two 
different time periods are being tested; a bull and bear stock market.  A question that needs to be 
answered is when did investors know that they were no longer in a bull market?  There is no 
definitive answer for this and as a result some judgement needs to be made.  In the year 2000 the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) hit an all time high of 11,723 in January,  and two months 
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later in March the NASDAQ Composite Index hit its all time high of 5,133.  After these points it 
is unclear of exactly when investors felt that the market dynamics had changed.  Many felt that in 
September of that year the market would increase as it had in previous years.  However that 
didn’t happen and the stock market continued to decline throughout the year.   
Because it is likely that most investors were uncertain if the market was in a bull or 
market phase for most of the year 2000, these observations are ignored in this analysis.  This 
allows almost a full year form the highest point of the DJIA for investors to realize that the bull 
market was over.  This results in the observations dated from the year 2001 onward given a value 
of one, and those observations from 1990 – 19999 were given a value of zero.    
When the dummy variable is included the regression equation looks like the following: 
iD
^
 = +
^α  1
^β FCFi + D/E2
^β i + TURN3
^β i + INS4
^β i + DUM5
^β i + ei                Eq.10 
where     – an estimate of the slope coefficient for DUM; it is expected that the sign 
will be positive as it is thought that investors will value more in times of 
market uncertainty 
5
^β
 DUMi – the dummy variable 
All other variables have the same definition and expected sign as were described for 
equation 9. 
Equation 10 is similar to equation 9 except that the dummy variable has replaced the 
variable that represented the year the dividend change took place; this was removed because 
including it would introduce collinearity into the model.   
 
                                                 
9 Other definitions of the time before the market declined were tested as well.  Similar results to those reported in 
Chapter 5 were found.  These secondary results are not reported.   
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4.3.4  Fama-Macbeth Regression 
A final methodology to test for firm specific variables is to use a Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
regression.  This specification requires that the regression equation specified in equation 9 be 
performed for each year that data is available.  Once these regressions are performed (20 in this 
sample), the coefficients are tested by determining if they are stable through time.  Specifically 
the Fama-Macbeth regression looks like the following: 
tiD ,
^
 = +t
^α  t,1
^β FCFi,t + D/Et,2
^β i,t + TURNt,3
^β i,t + INSt,4
^β i,t + ei,t           Eq. 11 
where the subscript t ranges from 1985-2004 and the variables maintain the same definitions they 
did in equation 9. 
Once the slope coefficients are estimated for each year, they are averaged which results 
in a Fama-Macbeth coefficient.  In order to calculate the significance of a particular beta, each is 
treated as a time series and the following t-test is performed: 
i
tit
βσ
β ,=     with n - 1 degrees of freedom                                  Eq.12 
where ti ,β  – the average beta over the sample period 
 
iβσ  –  the standard deviation of the beta over the time period 
  n – the number of years of the sample covers 
4.4  Limitations of Data and Methodology 
 The limitations found in this study are similar to those of other studies.  The underlying 
assumption of these studies is that the abnormal return to a dividend increase is a proper measure 
of dividend worth.  A second limitation is that only dividend increase announcements are used, 
this excludes other events such as dividend decrease announcements.  Dividend decreases are 
generally not used as these events occur less frequently, and they usually occur with other 
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corporate news items such as lower than expected earnings.  Thus it would be difficult (if not 
impossible) to determine how much of the market reaction is attributable to the dividend 
decrease and to the other corporate events.   
 Another limitation is that the relationship predicted is linear.  This assumption seems to 
be appropriate as it is used in all of the cited works. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 This chapter gives the details of the results for the hypotheses that are stated in chapter 3.  
The first section of this chapter illustrates the descriptive statistics and also discusses the 
abnormal return calculations.  It is found that most of the abnormal return is captured on the 
event day and thus the cumulative abnormal return is not carried forward.   
 The main research questions going into this project were to see if the market reacts 
differently to an increase in dividends through time, and to see if the market reaction is different 
depending on if the dividend increase occurs in a bear or bull market.  Investigating the reaction 
through time is discussed in detail in section 5.2.  Testing to see if the market reaction is different 
depending on market conditions is tested in section 5.3.  Hypotheses 3 through 7 are tested in 
each section.  The final hypothesis regarding the potential for a volume measure to increase the 
explanatory power of the model is tested for explicitly in section 5.3.   
 The main research questions have evidence to support them.  First, there is evidence that 
the market reaction to a dividend increase is declining.  This evidence comes from the consistent 
negative coefficient on the time variable in the different models tested in this chapter.  This is 
important as it is the first time that such a decline has been documented.  This may mean that 
investors do not have the same appetite for dividends as they once did. 
 The second question regarding market reaction during a bear or bull market also gave 
affirmative results.  However, evidence shows that the market reaction is less in bear markets.  
This is opposite of what was expected.  It was thought that the market reaction would be greater 
in bear markets as investors would more appreciate the increased dividend stream as capital 
gains are more uncertain.  One possible reason for this observation is that during bear markets 
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capital is more scarce, and market participants want firms to hold on to capital for a variety of 
reasons; some of which may be to invest in positive NPV projects or to save for the proverbial 
rainy day.  Another finding relating to the market reaction being less in the bear market is that 
the size of the firms who increased dividends is larger in this time period.  This leaves the 
possibility that the reaction to a dividend increase is smaller because there is more known about 
larger firms, which reduces the need for both signalling and reducing agency problems.   
 Some other surprising results are that the relationships that agency theory predicts do not 
hold.  This theory predicts that firms with the most potential agency conflicts should have a 
greater reaction to a dividend increase.  What is surprising is that this relationship appears to be 
negative.  The primary measure of agency costs is free cash flows.  Three alternative measures 
are explored to further the understanding of this relationship.  These are lagged free cash flows, 
cash flows from operations, and cash & cash equivalents.  What is found is that all proxies are 
negative, and depending on the proxy used they are significant.   
 Also disputing agency theory are the results for the debt to equity coefficient.  If agency 
theory is correct, this coefficient would be negative as firms with high debt loads have already 
decreased their agency conflicts.  What instead was found is that the market reacted positively to 
such firms.  This result is interpreted to mean that that firm’s with high debt loads who increase 
their dividend are signalling to the market that they are a high quality firm in spite of these high 
debt levels.   
 The results of the free cash flow and debt to equity coefficients are interpreted to mean 
that the agency cost theory of dividends does not hold.   
 Also of interest is that the liquidity measure, common share turnover, is significantly 
negative.  This means that there is a negative relationship between the liquidity of a stock and the 
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market’s reaction to an increase to its dividend.  This relationship is believed to be the result of it 
being easier to make a home made dividend in such firms, which means that market participants 
do not get as excited about these firms when they raise their dividends.   
 The final hypothesis relating to institutional holdings cannot be confirmed.  It does not 
appear to have a relationship with dividends.   
 Relating to the two additional hypotheses that were added as the research progressed; it is 
confirmed that firms with q-ratios less than one have a greater response to a dividend increase 
than firms whose q-ratios are greater than one.  This confirms the earlier work of Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989), but the fact that free cash flows are negatively related with market reaction 
contradicts their conclusions.  It is most likely that their results are driven by the fact that firms 
with q-ratios below one are seen as having poor investment prospects, and that the market 
interprets a dividend increase in these firms as signalling better future performance.   
 The final hypothesis regarding the volume measure did not increase the explanatory 
power of the model.  However, the volume measure itself is significant.  This is important, as a 
change in volume surrounding a dividend increase may be indicative of a change in dividend 
clientele as suggested by Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995).   
 Also to report is that the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression did not show any statistically 
significant results.  This is not all that surprising as this method is usually used on more uniform 
events than abnormal returns.  Some other models were also tried without much success.  These 
models depended on lagged values of the variables and the percentage change from one year to 
the next.  These last models are reported in section 5.3. 
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5.1  Preliminary Findings 
 This section presents preliminary results and descriptive statistics related to the variables. 
 Table 2 shows the abnormal returns surrounding announcements of dividend increases 
for each year in the 20-year period ending with 2004. In addition, it presents the results of 
performing the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return analysis. Several observations 
can be made from this table. First, the last row shows that the abnormal return of the entire 
sample is positive and statistically significant for the event day while the cumulative abnormal 
returns are not statistically significant. This observation suggests that most of the abnormal 
return is generated on the announcement day.  Second, Table 2 shows that abnormal returns are 
either not negative or not statistically significant for 11 of the 20 years considered in this study. 
In particular, the abnormal returns are not significant for any of the years in the six-year period 
ending with 2003. Furthermore, in 2004 the abnormal returns are statistically significant but 
contrary to expectations they are negative rather than positive. While far from conclusive, this 
suggests that the market’s reaction to a dividend increase is not consistent throughout the years. 
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Table 2 - Mean Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return for different years 
Year # of Firms 
Mean 
Abnormal 
Return 
T-statistic 
Mean 
CAR 
(-2 - +2) 
T-statistic
Mean 
CAR 
(-1 - +1) 
T-statistic 
1985 116 0.50% 3.39*** 1.06% 3.14*** 1.16% 4.41*** 
1986 84 0.34% 1.59 0.68% 1.44 0.60% 1.63 
1987 115 0.07% 0.43 -0.50% -1.26 -0.13% -0.46 
1988 147 0.30% 1.58 0.07% 0.16 0.58% 1.76 
1989 156 0.31% 2.43** 0.01% 0.05 0.35% 1.61 
1990 117 0.34% 2.09** 0.32% 0.87 0.47% 1.65 
1991 88 0.29% 1.22 0.91% 1.70* 0.73% 1.75* 
1992 114 0.83% 4.18*** 0.95% 2.04** 0.97% 2.70*** 
1993 121 0.42% 2.08** -0.11% -0.24 0.01% 0.04 
1994 152 0.41% 2.90*** 0.36% 1.11 0.19% 0.75 
1995 149 0.60% 4.13*** 1.00% 3.11*** 0.88% 3.53*** 
1996 158 0.32% 2.22** 0.37% 1.1 0.40% 1.58 
1997 120 0.29% 1.96** -0.07% -0.19 0.08% 0.3 
1998 124 -0.07% -0.42 0.24% 0.62 -0.12% -0.4 
1999 79 0.38% 1.57 0.21% 0.37 0.13% 0.3 
2000 83 0.24% 0.89 1.58% 2.64*** 0.57% 1.22 
2001 73 -0.05% -0.18 0.57% 0.99 0.39% 0.86 
2002 79 0.30% 1.35 0.66% 1.34 0.65% 1.69* 
2003 121 -0.03% -0.26 0.42% 1.5 -0.01% -0.04 
2004 107 -0.34% -2.30** -0.29% -0.82 -0.45% -1.71 
        
Entire 
Sample 2303 0.28% 2.32** 0.38% 1.31 0.36% 1.64 
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 Table 3 shows the mean, the standard deviation, and the quartile rankings for the different 
variables that are used in the regression analysis. The abnormal return per unit of dividend 
increase variable is the dependent variable for the regressions.   All variables are described in 
chapter 4. 
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Table 3 - Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables 
Quartiles  Mean Standard Deviation 1 2 3 4 
Percentage increase in 
Dividend 0.166 0.083 0.112 0.142 0.192 0.75 
Abnormal return 0.003 0.02 -0.007 0.001 0.013 0.087 
Abnormal return per unit of 
dividend increase 0.017 0.143 -0.049 0.011 0.08 0.592 
Debt to equity 0.65 0.914 0.126 0.354 0.782 12.134 
Common share turnover 0.634 0.436 0.333 0.535 0.823 3.025 
Free cash flow 2.596 5.077 0.992 1.98 3.332 45.24 
Q-ratio 2.373 1.777 1.316 1.827 2.741 15.48 
Institutional holdings 0.443 0.213 0.281 0.46 0.6 1 
10 day excess volume 0.648 7.578 -2.141 0 2.926 79.036 
5 Day excess volume 0.551 4.652 -1.156 0.192 1.934 40.125 
2 Day excess volume 0.33 2.963 -0.483 0.099 0.915 33.916 
 
 Table 4 shows the correlation between the explanatory variables used in the regression 
equations. The highest correlation is 45.77%, which is observed between common share turnover 
and institutional holdings. As suggested by Gujarati (2003), multicollinearity is not a problem if 
the correlation among the different variables is less than 80%.  It has also been suggested that if 
the correlations are statistically significant that one of the offending variables should be dropped.  
The significance of the correlation coefficient is partly determined by the number of 
observations, and with a large sample such as this the correlation can be quite low and still be 
rendered to be significant.  In particular, for a sample of this size anything with a correlation 
greater than 4.08% (in absolute value) is considered to be significant correlation.  This would 
result in all of the variables being dropped because all have correlations greater than this.  As a 
result, this rule is not used.   
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Table 4 – Correlation between the explanatory variables 
 
Debt to 
Equity 
Share 
Turnover
Free Cash 
Flow Q-ratio 
Institutional 
Holdings 
Debt to Equity -- 0.1341 0.0751 0.1326 0.0911 
Share Turnover 0.1341 -- 0.1630 0.0600 0.4577 
Free Cash Flow 0.0751 0.1630 -- -0.1051 0.1159 
Q-ratio 0.1326 0.0600 -0.1051 -- 0.2350 
Institutional Holdings 0.0911 0.4577 0.1159 0.2350 -- 
 
5.2.1 Investigating the Market’s Reaction to Dividend Increases 
 This section tests Hypothesis 1 and Hypotheses 3-7.  Regression analysis is utilized for 
this purpose. Abnormal return per unit of dividend increase is regressed against free cash flow, 
the debt to equity ratio, share turnover, institutional holdings, and the time variable. Table 5 
summarizes the results of performing this analysis. 
Table 5 – Identifying the factors that affect the market’s reaction to a dividend increase 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value
Intercept 0.0499 5.08*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow -0.0007 -1.47 0.143 
Debt to Equity 0.0044 2.02** 0.043 
Share Turnover -0.0195 -2.31** 0.021 
Institutional Holdings -0.0111 -0.61 0.543 
Time -0.0014 -2.19** 0.029 
    
R2 0.03  
Adjusted R2 0.03   
F-Value 4.19***   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 Table 5 shows that a firm’s debt to equity ratio, share turnover, and the year the dividend 
took place have significant relationships to how investors value dividends.  The most notable 
result of this table is the significantly negative relationship that exists between the market’s 
reaction to a dividend increase and the year the dividend increase took place. The coefficient for 
the time variable is -0.14%, this results in a total decline of 2.66% of abnormal return over the 
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entire sample.  This is important as it provides evidence that the market does not concern itself 
with dividend increases, and hence dividends, as much as it once did.  It is not surprising to find 
this as Fama and French (2001) documented that firms have a lower propensity to pay dividends.  
Combining their results with those found here imply that a firm’s decreased propensity to pay 
dividends may be the result of a change in investor demand.  Some of the possible reasons as to 
why this pattern is found may be the improvements in corporate governance, more timely 
releases of company information, and more efficient methods of distributing profits.  These 
changes may mean that dividends are no longer needed to signal a firm’s quality or to reduce its 
agency costs.   
 Now turning the examination to the other variables there are a number of interesting 
observations.  The first is that the slope coefficient on the debt to equity ratio is significantly 
positive, when it was expected to be negative.  It was thought to be negative as dividends and 
interest payments both reduce the potential agency costs of a firm.  Thus, if a firm has large 
interest payments, the increased dividend payment would be redundant as Jensen (1986) points 
out.  What a positive coefficient suggests is that investors value dividends more for firms that 
have high debt loads.  The most logical explanation for this, and previously not expressed in the 
literature, is that interest payments place cash flow constraints on a firm; and a firm that raises its 
dividend in spite of its already constrained cash flow is signalling to the market that it expects 
future cash flows to be high enough to maintain both the current debt load and the increased 
dividend stream.  This suggestion supports the signalling theory at the expense of agency theory. 
 A firm’s common share turnover is significantly negative.  This is the first time that an 
attempt has been made to see if the market reacts differently to firms with different liquidity 
levels.  This is important as it should be easier to sell stock (and thus the process of making a 
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homemade dividend is easier) when a firm is more liquid.  The evidence from Table 5 shows this 
is true as the higher a firm’s common share turnover, the lower the market’s reaction to a 
dividend increase. The advantage to investors of being able to create their own dividend is that it 
allows the investor to time their consumption decisions and tax liabilities; whereas dividends 
force both of these events unilaterally on all shareholders.   
 The coefficients of institutional holdings and free cash flow measures are both negative 
but statistically insignificant.  In particular, it is surprising to see that the free cash flow measure 
is negative when agency theory predicts it should be positive. If it was significant, it may 
contradict the conclusions of Lang and Litzenberger (1989). They suggest that a firm with 
substantial free cash flows will have tendency to over-invest by accepting marginal investment 
projects while increases in dividend payments will reduce the ability of managers to invest in 
such projects. Therefore, a dividend increase by a firm that has a high level of free cash flow 
should have a positive effect on share prices. As a result, further investigation is warranted.  
 It is important to remember that Lang and Litzenberger (1989) never computed a firm’s 
free cash flow. They made their conclusions about a firm’s free cash flow by looking at the 
relation between dividend increases and the firm’s q-ratio. They tested to see if there was a 
statistically significant difference between firms whose q-ratios were greater than and less than 
one.  They found that firms with q-ratios less than one had a statistically significant larger 
reaction to dividend increases.  They concluded from this that firms with larger free cash flows 
(and hence greater agency costs) have greater responses to dividend changes.  While it is 
possible that a relationship may exist between a firm’s q-ratio and its free cash flows, it is 
important to point out that free cash flows were never calculated in Lang and Litzenberger’s 
(1989) study.  What if the assumption that the relationship between free cash flows and agency 
 72 
 
  
costs that they postulate is not true?  It is more appropriate to calculate the free cash flows of a 
firm and then test for the relationship.  It is also important to recognize that the q-ratio 
traditionally measures a firm’s growth prospects, not its agency conflicts.   
In order to see if there is any correlation between free cash flows and the q-ratios for the 
firms in this sample their correlation coefficient was calculated.  The result of this was surprising 
as the correlation was only 0.01466, which essentially means that there isn’t any correlation.  In 
order to test the robustness of this number I gathered the q-ratios and free cash flows for all of 
the firms who declared a dividend in 2004 and calculated the correlation coefficient for this 
second sample.  This ended up being –0.00261 which confirms that the correlation between a 
firm’s q-ratio and free cash flows is negligible.  This means that the assumption that a 
relationship between free cash flows and q-ratios is not warranted. 
In order to see if my sample is similar to Lang and Litzenberger’s (1989) in that those 
firms’ whose q-ratios are less than one have greater responses to increases in dividends a 
difference of means test was used.  The results show that firms with q-ratios less than one had a 
significantly larger reaction to dividend increases.  The t-statistic for this test is 2.08 which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  This means that my sample has the similar characteristic 
to Lang and Litzenberger’s (1989) in that firms with q-ratios less than one have a greater market 
response to an increase in dividends.   
The fact that I get the same results as Lang and Litzenberger (1989), that q-ratios have 
essentially no correlation with free cash flows, and that a previous study by Lie10 (2000) found 
no relationship between abnormal returns (not abnormal returns per unit of dividend increase) 
and his measure of ‘undistributed cash flow’ (not free cash flow per share), gives rise to the 
                                                 
10 For a full comparison of Lie’s (2000) measure and the one used in this thesis please refer to section 4.2 
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possibility that a negative relationship may exist between free cash flows of a firm and its 
dividend.  This possibility is further examined in the next sub-section. 
5.2.2 Exploring Other Measures of Free Cash Flow 
 As the proposed free cash flow measure is cumbersome to calculate and relies on many 
inputs, it may be possible that investors use a different or simpler measure to estimate potential 
agency costs. For this reason, I repeat the same analysis by using different measures of free cash 
flows. First, I repeat the analysis using lagged free cash flows. This is the same measure of free 
cash flows used previously except it is lagged by one year.  A lag is important as investors may 
be dealing with old or stagnant information, and the lag allows for information to be incorporated 
fully.  Old information may be relevant to the decision makers’ reactions as the majority of 
dividend increases coincide with a firm’s fiscal year end, and the current financial statements are 
not available generally for three months. It can be argued that the lag isn’t necessary for the other 
variables (and illustrated later in this chapter in section 5.3) as they are much simpler to estimate 
because they have fewer inputs.  Second, I use operating cash flows as the proxy for free cash 
flows. This is a simple measure as it is reported in the financial statements. This measure of cash 
flows may be more relevant as it is often considered the firm’s sustainable cash flow. Third, I use 
cash plus cash equivalents as a simple measure of the potential agency costs. This may be 
relevant as it measures the amount of cash that a manager can mismanage without having to raise 
any more capital or earn any more profits. The final measure is taking the original measure of 
free cash flow per share and then dividing it by share price.  This final measure incorporates the 
possibility that free cash flows are priced in the market, and thus the relationship can be better 
seen between dividends and cash flows once they are priced accordingly.   
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 The same regression equation that is used to generate Table 5 is used in this analysis. 
Only the free cash flow variable changes. In an additional step, I add to the equation a dummy 
variable for the q-ratio. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the firm’s q-ratio is greater 
than one and 0 otherwise.  The q-ratio is added as a dichotomous variable rather than a 
continuous one in order to be consistent with the work of Land and Litzenberger (1989).  In 
section 5.3 (a section that discusses other model specifications) it is analyzed as a continuous 
variable.  The q-ratio is added because it was shown in the difference of means test that there 
was a significantly different response to an increase to a dividend depending on the firm’s q-
ratio. It is important to see if this relationship holds when the other variables are included.    
 Table 6 shows that the different proxies for free cash flow produce results consistent with 
the findings reported in Table 5. Specifically the coefficients are negative for the new free cash 
flow variables. In addition, they are significant at the 10% and 5% levels for the lagged free cash 
flows and for the cash and cash equivalents measure respectively.  While the significance of the 
free cash flow measures can be debated as its significance depends on which measure is used, it 
is clear from Tables 5 and 6 that the evidence does not support the theoretical relationships that 
agency theory predicts.  On the contrary, evidence presented in these tables seems to contradict 
the proposition that dividend increases should reduce the potential for agency conflicts. 
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Table 6 – Testing alternative proxies for the firm’s free cash flow 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Panel A – Free Cash Flow Lagged 
Intercept 0.0753 4.95*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow Lagged -0.0009 -1.73* 0.084 
Debt to Equity 0.0047 1.93* 0.054 
Share Turnover -0.0208 -2.45** 0.014 
Inst. Holdings -0.0053 -0.28 0.780 
Time -0.0015 -2.28** 0.023 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.0284 -2.04** 0.042 
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 4.37***   
    
Panel B – Operating Cash Flows 
Intercept 0.0755 4.77*** 0.000 
Operating Cash Flows -0.0006 -1.04 0.298 
Debt to Equity 0.0045 1.93* 0.054 
Share Turnover -0.0222 -2.53** 0.011 
Inst. Holdings -0.0041 -0.02 0.8334 
Time -0.0015 -2.29** 0.022 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.0259 -1.83* 0.067 
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 3.91   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
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Table 6 (Continued) – Testing alternative proxies for the firm’s free cash flow 
 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Panel C – Cash and Cash Equivalents 
Intercept 0.0771 5.13*** 0.000 
Cash  and Cash 
Equivalents -0.0002 -1.96* 0.050 
Debt to Equity 0.0039 1.85** 0.028 
Share Turnover -0.0215 -2.54** 0.011 
Inst. Holdings -0.0058 -0.31 0.757 
Time -0.0014 -2.2** 0.028 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.0278 -2.18** 0.029 
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 4.52   
 
Panel D – FCF per share divided by Share Price 
Intercept 0.0729 4.91*** 0.000 
FCF per Share / Share 
Price -2.8963 -1.26 0.209 
Debt to Equity 0.0027 1.27 0.205 
Share Turnover -0.0243 -2.88** 0.004 
Inst. Holdings -0.0021 -0.011 0.911 
Time -0.0014 -2.08** 0.038 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.0298 -2.19* 0.028 
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 3.91   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 Another important insight gained from Table 6 is that the q-ratio is negative and 
significantly different from zero.  This means that those firms whose q-ratios are less than one 
have larger reactions to dividend increases.  This confirms the difference of means test and the 
results of Lang and Litzenberger (1989). A possible interpretation of this result is that investors 
interpret a dividend increase from a firm that has low investment prospects (as measured by a q-
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ratio of less than one) as a signal of future performance, and this signal is in spite of the market’s 
low expectations.  If this is correct, undervalued firms could use this to their advantage by 
signalling their future prospects and thereby increase their value by increasing their dividend.   
5.3 Other Model Specifications 
A potential critique of all the results so far may be that the R2 measures are small.  While 
this is true, the R2 reported in Tables 5 and 6 are similar in scale to those reported by other 
studies that have examined abnormal returns surrounding dividend changes.  For example Lie 
(2000) reports having an adjusted R2 of 0.04 for the two regressions he ran on his dividend 
initiation sample.  It is also important to remember that the chance of finding significant 
variables by chance with such small R2 values is extremely low which decreases the likelihood of 
finding spurious relationships. The purpose of this section is to test whether different model 
specifications can increase the R2 values. 
It is also important to look at the economic significance of these variables, just not the 
statistical significance.  The coefficients on the variables are quite small.  Remembering that by 
definition an abnormal return over one day is small, then it is not surprising that the coefficients 
describing it are of the same magnitude. 
Examining the issues of multicollinearity will also be explored further here.  In particular 
is the concern that the institutional ownership variable is highly correlated with other variables 
but does not appear to be significantly related to the dependent variable. 
5.3.1  Multicollinearity 
In order to deal with multicollinearity two methods will be chosen.  First, the institutional 
variable will be dropped from the regression equation.  If multicollinearity is a problem and an 
offending variable is dropped, then it is expected that there will be a dramatic shift in the 
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interpretation of the variables such as a variable changing its sign.  The second method to deal 
with multicollinearity is to regress institutional ownership on the dependent variable (abnormal 
return/percentage increase in dividend), and then include the residual from the fitted relationship 
and observation as a proxy for institutional ownership.  This leaves a variable that is related to 
institutional ownership and unrelated to the other independent variables 
Table 7 Panel A shows the results of excluding the institutional holdings variable, Panel 
B shows the results of replacing the institutional holdings variable with the residual just 
described.   
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Table 7 – Testing multicollinearity problems in the model 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Panel A – Removing institutional holdings variable  
Intercept 0.0686 4.92*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow -0.0004 -0.92 0.356 
Debt to Equity 0.0032 1.59 0.112 
Share Turnover -0.0210 -2.86*** 0.004 
Time -0.0013 -2.10** 0.035 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.0265 -2.07** 0.039 
    
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 4.44***   
    
Panel B – Using residual as proxy for institutional holdings 
Intercept 0.0739 5.04*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow -0.0007 -1.43 0.153 
Debt to Equity 0.0042 1.94* 0.052 
Share Turnover -0.0214 -2.52** 0.0117 
Time -0.0014 -2.09** 0.037 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.0295 -2.18** 0.029 
Residual -0.0023 -0.13 0.900 
    
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 4.28***   
    
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 As seen in Table 7 Panel A, the regression coefficients do not change very much from 
previous tables when the institutional holding variable is excluded in the regression.  Their 
interpretations also do not change in Panel B when the residual is substituted into the regression.  
These are important observations as they indicate that multicollinearity is not a problem affecting 
the interpretation of the other variables.     
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5.3.2  Changing Model Specifications in Order to Increase Explanatory Power 
Different Dependent Variable Measure 
 Similar studies in this area, such as Lie (2000), used unadjusted abnormal returns as their 
return measure instead of the abnormal return divided by the percentage dividend increase.  It 
was hoped that the measure introduced here would be more precise as the abnormal return of a 
dividend increase is likely related to the size of the dividend increase.  Specifically, all else 
equal, a larger dividend increase likely means a larger signal and a larger decrease in agency 
costs.  However, dividing this abnormal return by the percentage in the dividend change may 
introduce too much noise in the dependent variable being used.  As a result, a similar regression 
is performed that was reported in Table 5 except that the dependent variable has now changed to 
the raw abnormal return.  These results are reported as Table 8.  
Table 8 – Abnormal return as dependent variable 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Intercept 0.0114 5.20*** 0.0000 
Free Cash Flow -0.0002 -2.42** 0.0158 
Debt to Equity 0.0009 2.78*** 0.0054 
Share Turnover -0.0028 -2.29** 0.0223 
Institutional Holdings -0.0004 -0.13 0.8958 
Time -0.0045 -2.29** 0.0225 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.4841 -2.58*** 0.0100 
    
R2 0.02   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 5.60***   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 Table 8 illustrates that that the R2 does not increase with the change in the dependent 
variable.  The range of R2 values in prior tables has been in the range of 0.01 - 0.03.  One 
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variable of interest in this table is the free cash flow measure, which is now significant when it 
was not in Table 5.  This provides more support for the possibility of the free cash flow measure 
having a statistically significant negative relationship.   
Abnormal Trading Volume 
 Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) studied the market reaction to events of dividend 
initiations and omissions. They argue that volume changes around these events indicate that investors are 
shifting in or out of a stock that experienced a change. Thus, abnormal volume surrounding dividend 
initiations and omissions is an indication of clientele effects. Consistent with Michaely, Thaler, and 
Womack (1995), an additional variable that measures the abnormal volume changes surrounding 
the dividend increase date is included in the regressions. The volume measure that is described in 
section 4.2 for the different time periods is used for this purpose.  It is hoped that the additional 
information that the market provides with the change in volume will increase the explanatory 
power of the model while preserving the conclusions related to the other variables.  The results 
of these regressions are presented in Table 9.   
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Table 9 – Including abnormal volume measure 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Panel A – 10 day Measure 
Intercept 0.0715 4.56*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow  -0.0007 -1.47 0.143 
Debt to Equity 0.0041 1.89* 0.059 
Share Turnover -0.0211 -2.48** 0.013 
Institutional Holdings -0.002 -0.13 0.897 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable  -0.0285 -2.08** 0.038 
Time -2.6180 -2.02** 0.043 
10 Day Measure 0.0010 2.08** 0.038 
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.02 (0.01)   
F-Value 3.38***   
    
Panel B – 5 Day Measure 
Intercept 0.0714 4.55*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow  -0.0007 -1.46 0.145 
Debt to Equity 0.0041 1.90* 0.057 
Share Turnover -0.0216 -2.54** 0.011 
Institutional Holdings -0.0020 -0.11 0.914 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable  -0.0295 -2.16** 0.031 
Time -2.5706 -1.99 0.046 
5 Day Measure 0.0020 2.66*** 0.008 
R2 (Adjusted R2) 0.02 (0.01)   
F-value  3.38***   
    
Panel C – 2 Day Measure 
Intercept 0.0705 4.49*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow  -0.0008 -1.51 0.131 
Debt to Equity 0.0042 -1.90* 0.057 
Share Turnover -0.0219 -2.58*** 0.010 
Institutional Holdings -0.0026 -0.14 0.891 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable  -0.0281 -2.06** 0.039 
Time -2.4536 -1.90* 0.058 
2 Day Measure 0.0044 3.73*** 0.000 
R2 (Adjusted R2)  0.02 (0.02)     
F-Value 3.62***   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
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 Table 9 illustrates that the change in volume variable is significant for all three time 
periods and the related t-statistic is increasing with shorter time periods. In addition, the 
explanatory power of the model increases marginally with the additional variable. This evidence 
shows that there is a relationship between volume changes and dividend increases and that the 
effects of the volume change is detectable for at least 10 days following the dividend increase.  
 Note that Michaely et al. (1995) did not find significant changes in volume when they 
looked at firms who initiated or omitted a dividend. The analysis here shows that the market 
reaction to announcements of dividend increases is positively affected by the changes in volume 
following the announcement. This provides some evidence that there might be some dividend 
clientele shifting. Yet, a full analysis of volume changes surrounding dividend increases is 
needed to confirm the existence of clientele effects. 
 Table 9 also shows that the conclusions regarding the other independent variables do not 
change with the inclusion of the change in volume variable.   
Lagged Values and Percentage Increases in Variables 
 Another way to try to increase the R2 of the regressions is to alter the definitions of the 
variables.  The first method is to use lag values of the variables, and the second method is to use 
percentage increases in the variables from the previous years.   The lagged model is based on the 
idea that investors are using old information to include in their analysis as current year data may 
not be available (also for this model the time variable is not lagged as it does not seam 
appropriate to do so).  The percentage increase model is based on the possibility that investors 
are concerned with changes in the variables and not in their absolute levels.  For this second 
model, the time variable, and the q-ratio dummy variable are not lagged.  The results of these 
regressions are found in Table 10. 
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Table 10 – Lagged Values and Percentage Increase Values for independent variables   
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Panel A – Lagged Values 
Intercept 0.1038 3.55*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow  -0.0024 -2.00** 0.046 
Debt to Equity 0.0065 1.48 0.180 
Share Turnover -0.0144 -1.12 0.263 
Institutional Holdings -0.0120 -0.21 0.838 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable  -0.0517 -0.76 0.447 
Time -0.0015 -0.76 0.447 
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 1.92**   
    
Panel B – Percentage Increase 
Intercept 0.1000 3.75*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow  0.0002 0.94 0.349 
Debt to Equity -0.0004 -0.99 0.321 
Share Turnover 0.0036 0.33 0.739 
Institutional Holdings 0.0005 0.94 0.349 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable  -0.0591 -2.78*** 0.006 
Time -0.0019 -0.98 0.328 
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 1.91*   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 The primary aim of Table 10 was to try and increase the R2 of the regression.  As seen in 
this table, the R2 is not increased for either panel A or B when compared to earlier results.  Also 
in unreported results, the regressions were performed without including the time and the q-ratio 
dummy variables, as these were not transformed.  The results of these unreported models were 
not materially different.  As there was a time cost to gathering this data, the data was only 
collected for the years 1990-1999.  As the only significant t-statistic for this table is the free cash 
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flow measure in Panel A, it appears that it is more appropriate to use current year data than either 
of these alternatives. 
Q-ratio treated as a continuous variable 
 In order to try and further understand the value of the q-ratio in this modelling process, it 
is now introduced as a continuous variable rather than a dichotomous one.  It was originally 
modelled as a dummy variable to follow the methodology of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) who 
found that dividend valuation was dependent on a firm’s q-ratio being above or below unity.    
Table 11 shows the results of this regression.   
Table 11 – Q-ratio as a continuous variable instead of a dummy variable 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
Intercept 0.0505 5.07*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow -0.0008 -1.49 0.135 
Debt to Equity 0.0045 2.05** 0.040 
Share Turnover -0.0197 -2.32** 0.021 
Inst. Holdings -0.0095 -0.50 0.614 
Time -0.0014 -2.17** 0.030 
Q Ratio Continuous Variable -0.0005 -0.36 0.717 
R2 0.01   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 3.50***   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 As seen in Table 11, treating the q-ratio as a continuous variable does not materially alter 
the values of the coefficients or their significance.  It is important to see that while the q-ratio is 
still negative, it is no longer a significant variable.  This gives evidence that the relationship for 
this variable is better modeled dichotomously, and that investors are more concerned with the q-
ratio’s relation to being above/below unity than its true value.     
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Fama-Macbeth Regression 
 A final model was performed using a Fama-Macbeth regression.  Fama-Macbeth 
regressions rely on the stability of the coefficients being tested and it was hoped that this 
additional method would uphold the previous results presented throughout this chapter.  The 
results of the Fama-Macbeth regression are found in Table 12. 
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Table 12 – Fama-Macbeth regression results 
Year Debt to Equity Share Turnover  
Institutional 
Holdings Free Cash Flow   
 Slope T-Stat Slope T-Stat Slope T-Stat Slope T-Stat R2 Adj. R2
1985 -0.00752 -0.46 -0.03264 -0.83 0.07798 0.10 -0.00085 -0.43 0.0248 -0.0309
1986 0.00796 0.26 -0.01284 -0.20 0.01602 0.13 -0.01211 -1.92** 0.0648 -0.0020
1987 0.00649 0.11 -0.00092 -0.01 0.13789 0.97 0.00046 0.10 0.0133 -0.0332
1988 0.00274 0.79 -0.00711 -0.18 -0.04020 -0.47 0.00385 1.94** 0.0420 0.0554
1989 -0.00003 0.00 -0.02566 -1.18 0.10532 1.80* 0.00075 0.26 0.0296 -0.0030
1990 -0.00589 -0.50 0.01950 0.34 -0.02118 -0.17 0.00489 1.02 0.0132 -0.0338
1991 0.03576 1.54 -0.01746 -0.55 -0.10952 -1.10 -0.00175 -0.35 0.0796 0.0127
1992 -0.00754 -0.66 0.06520 1.22 -0.17556 -1.53 0.00031 0.11 0.0458 -0.0026
1993 0.02259 3.01** -0.02835 -0.59 0.06332 0.67 -0.00085 -0.61 0.0942 0.0583
1994 -0.00191 -0.09 -0.02702 -0.82 -0.04835 -0.64 0.00214 0.47 0.0112 -0.1830
1995 -0.02804 -1.29 0.04380 1.62 -0.07396 -1.39 0.00100 0.40 0.0342 0.0047
1996 -0.00645 -0.47 -0.00540 -0.22 -0.03366 -0.54 -0.00151 -0.82 0.0161 -0.0132
1997 0.00886 0.44 0.00659 0.11 0.11510 0.16 -0.00451 -1.04 0.0153 -0.0241
1998 0.05331 2.38** -0.02332 -0.44 0.11418 1.46 -0.00512 -1.34 0.0646 0.0272
1999 -0.00063 -0.02 -0.05329 -0.50 -0.02806 -0.20 -0.00142 -0.42 0.0166 -0.0459
2000 -0.01504 -0.69 0.02921 0.37 -0.05864 -0.41 -0.00029 -0.05 0.0095 -0.0463
2001 0.01701 1.59 0.03368 0.69 -0.03597 -0.49 0.00729 1.22 0.0740 0.0133
2002 -0.00870 -0.77 -0.07192 -1.68 0.06935 0.65 0.00285 0.69 0.0593 0.0040
2003 0.00728 1.58 0.00393 0.20 -0.01577 -0.32 -0.00202 0.00 0.0327 -0.0025
2004 0.00329 0.52 -0.09565 2.98** -0.01614 -0.19 0.00091 0.78 0.1808 0.1460
           
Average 0.00418  -0.00998  0.00211  -0.00030    
           
Std. Dev.  0.01793  0.03847  0.08313  0.00405    
           
T- Stat 0.2330  -0.2595  0.0254  -0.0737    
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
 89
 As Table 12 shows, not much can be garnered from the Fama-Macbeth regression.  The 
Fama-Macbeth coefficients (reported as the average in Table 10) are not significant for any of 
the variables tested.  It is easy to see why they are not significant as the Fama-Macbeth 
coefficients depend on stability, and the coefficients presented in Table 10 are not stable through 
the years and they often switch between being positive and negative.   
5.4  The Impact of Market Conditions on the Reaction to Dividend Increases.  
 From 1983 to 2000 the stock market was in a bull market that some consider it to be the 
strongest one that the United States has ever seen.  There were a few market drops along the way 
such as what has become known as Black Monday in October 1987 and the currency crises of 
the late 1990s.  However, neither of these events caused too much disruption as the stock market 
increased on an annual basis for each calendar year during this time period.  The decline that 
started in 2000 was different though as the market finished lower that year, and it closed at lower 
levels in both 2001 and 2002.  It is possible that entering a bear market from such a prolonged 
bull market may affect the way the market reacts to a dividend increase.   
 In order to test this, the results of equation 10 (with the q-ratio dummy variable added as 
it has been shown to be significant) are presented in Table 13.   
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Table 13 – Results of testing for valuation differences between bear and bull markets 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Intercept 0.0694 4.92*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow -0.0008 -1.60 0.110 
Debt to Equity 0.0493 2.28** 0.023 
Share Turnover -0.0201 -2.36** 0.018 
Institutional Holdings 0.0002 0.01 0.993 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable -0.0351 -2.56** 0.011 
Crash Dummy Variable -0.0284 -3.10*** 0.002 
    
R2 0.02   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 5.65***   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 In examining Table 13, it is seen that the crash dummy variable is significantly negative.  
This is surprising as it indicates that the market responds less to a dividend increase in a bear 
market, when it was thought the reaction would be greater.  The original argument presented in 
chapter 3 was that the market reaction would be greater for the following two reasons: first, the 
market would place greater emphasis on dividends when capital gains were less likely; and 
secondly it was thought that dividends would act as a greater signal when the market was in 
duress.  However it is apparent that these arguments do not hold.  A couple of new theories are 
brought forward to explain this surprising result.   
 The first explanation assumes that investors are rational economic agents.  In this theory, 
investors are aware that raising a dividend places restrictions on future cash flows of a firm, as 
the firm will be reluctant to cut this dividend once it has been increased.  These restrictions mean 
that firms will more likely need outside financing in order to invest in profitable projects.  For 
the time period after the market started to decline, it could be argued that outside capital was 
more difficult to obtain.  The logic that follows is that shareholders would prefer that firms hold 
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on to cash during times when capital is scarce, as the firm may need the capital more than 
shareholders need the dividend.  This possibility is interesting because it actually goes against 
what agency theory would predict as it illustrates a situation where shareholders are willing to 
increase the amount of cash a firm has, and therefore its potential agency conflicts. 
The second explanation relies on behavioural finance, specifically the theory proposed by 
Thaler (1983) and discussed in detail in section 2.4.  In this theory, Thaler (1983) proposes that 
dividends are treated as a silver lining in periods of market decline, and treated as an added 
bonus during periods of market strength.  If one subscribes to this theory, then Table 13 shows 
that the added bonus is worth more than the silver lining  
 Seeing that a change in market reaction occurs when the sample is divided up between 
those events that took place before and after the year 2000, another set of regressions is 
performed in order to see if the firm specific factors (thus ignoring the crash dummy and the year 
the dividend took place) are different between these two time periods.  Table 14 shows the 
results of these regressions.  
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Table 14 - Showing the differences in valuation prior to and after the stock market crash 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Panel A – 1990-1999 
Intercept 0.0921 3.46*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow  -0.0011 -1.36 0.173 
Debt to Equity 0.0080 1.97** 0.049 
Share Turnover -0.0088 -0.70 0.4867 
Institutional Holdings -0.0033 -0.13 0.899 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable  -0.0450 -2.27** 0.023 
R2 0.02   
Adjusted R2 0.01   
F-Value 2.05**   
    
Panel B – 2000-2004 
Intercept 0.0442 1.55 0.122 
Free Cash Flow  -0.0004 -0.50 0.617 
Debt to Equity 0.0040 1.15 0.250 
Share Turnover -0.0455 -2.90*** 0.004 
Institutional Holdings 0.0020 0.06 0.955 
Q Ratio Dummy Variable  -0.0161 -0.58 0.563 
R2 0.06   
Adjusted R2 0.05   
F-Value 4.44***   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
  
 The most striking result of Table 14 is that prior to the market crash all of the coefficients 
except for those on institutional holdings and common share turnover were significant, and after 
the crash the only significant variable is common share turnover. It should not be surprising that 
investors are more aware of liquidity after the stock market crashed.  What is not intuitive though 
is why the other variables are no longer significant.  It would seem that there would be more 
investor scrutiny and hence greater market awareness of these variables in the second time 
period.  In order to test to see if any of the variables are significantly different between the two 
periods, all the firm specific variables are interacted with the crash dummy.  This allows us to 
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draw specific conclusions about the differences that exist between the two time periods.  These 
results are found in Table 15. 
Table 15 –  Identifying factors that are different after the market crash 
 Coefficient T-statistic P-Value 
Intercept 0.0767 4.00*** 0.000 
Debt to Equity 0.0063 2.07** 0.039 
Free Cash Flow -0.0014 -2.14** 0.032 
Inst. Holdings 0.0054 0.25 0.802 
Share Turnover -0.0079 -0.79 0.432 
Q-ratio Dummy  -0.0401 -2.55** 0.011 
Crash Dummy -0.0167 -0.44 0.658 
Crash * Debt to Equity -0.0042 -0.82 0.413 
Crash * Share Turnover -0.0426 -2.07** 0.039 
Crash * Inst. Holdings -0.0010 -0.02 0.983 
Crash * Free Cash Flow 0.0017 1.44 0.149 
Crash * Q-ratio Dummy 0.0232 0.64 0.522 
    
R2 0.06   
Adjusted R2 0.05   
F-Value 3.73***   
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 Table 15 is interesting in that it shows that the liquidity measure, common share turnover, 
is not significant for the whole sample (as seen by not having a significant coefficient on the base 
variable) but it is after the market crash as evidenced by its significance when interacted with the 
crash dummy variable.  As stated earlier, it is intuitive to understand why investors would pay 
more attention to liquidity after the stock market started to decline as positions may need to be 
sold quickly.   
 It is also interesting in this regression to see that the coefficients for the debt to equity and 
free cash flow are significant for the whole sample which is once again opposite to what agency 
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theory predicts.  This provides more evidence that investors are not concerned with the potential 
agency costs of dividends as discussed in section 5.3.   
 As it has been shown that the market reacts differently to a dividend increase depending 
on the time period it took place in, it is worthwhile to look at the descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables for each time period.  Table 16 shows the means for the two time periods, 
and it also reports the t-statistic from the standard difference of means test.  
Table 16 – Summary statistics for the time periods 1990-1999 and 2001-2004 
1990-1999 2001-2004 
  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Difference of 
means T-stat. P-value 
Debt to Equity 0.600 0.798 0.999 1.269 5.51*** 0.000 
Share Turnover 0.609 0.409 0.788 0.592 5.24*** 0.000 
Free Cash Flow 2.292 4.386 4.044 7.927 3.93*** 0.000 
Q-ratio 2.275 1.601 3.059 2.55 5.39*** 0.000 
Institutional Holdings 0.431 0.213 0.486 0.255 3.57*** 0.000 
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
 Table 16 shows that all of the variables are larger in the second time period.  This is 
interesting as it may indicate that there was a shift in the firms who increased their dividend.  
Particularly, larger values of these variables indicate larger and more established firms.  For 
example, it is common knowledge that more established firms attract more institutional 
ownership.   In order to test the possibility that only larger firms increased their dividend in the 
second time period three different measures of size are gathered and then tested for using a 
difference of means test.  The three size measures gathered are market value of equity, total 
assets, and sales.  Different measures are gathered in order to ensure that the results are not 
biased according to the definition of firm size.  These results are found in Table 17.     
 94 
 
 95
Table 17 – Examining the size of the firms for the time periods 1990-1999 and 2001-2004 
1990-1999 2001-2004 
  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
Difference of 
means T - stat. P-value 
Sales 4269 11804 5281 13996 1.23 0.210 
Market Value 5475 14734 11337 37077 2.95*** 0.003 
Total Assets 10218 37227 25469 35409 2.54** 0.011 
***, **, and * denote respectively significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
 
    The figures reported in Table 17 are in millions of dollars.  The total assets and market 
value measures for firm size indicate that firms were larger in the second time period when 
compared to the first.  This is important because large firms broadly speaking have a larger 
shareholder base and a larger analyst following.  These facts result in more information being 
known about larger firms.  As a result, the signalling theory of dividends would predict the 
smaller market reaction in the second time period as these firms have less to signal.   
 For both Tables 16 and 17, the result of being larger in the second time period could be 
the result of inflationary type pressures on these variables.  As a result first time period was 
reduced to the years 1995-1999 and the analysis was repeated.  In unreported results, shortening 
the time frame in the first period does not alter the significance of any of the variables in either 
Tables 16 and 17.   
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY FINDINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Section 6.1 summarizes the findings of this thesis.  The most important results were that 
evidence is found that the market reaction to a dividend increase is a decreasing function of time, 
and that this reaction is smaller in a bear market when compared to a bull market.  In addition, 
the market reaction to a dividend increase is smaller for firms who have large free cash flows and 
greater liquidity while firms with high debt to equity ratios have larger reactions.  
 Section 6.2 discusses the directions for future research. These include exploring the 
market reaction to share repurchases and further exploring the signalling theory of dividends as 
evidence found in this study contradicts the predictions of agency theory.     
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6.1  Summary of the Findings 
 The following is a list of findings that were presented in this thesis as related to the stated 
hypothesis in chapter 3. 
1) There is evidence that the market reaction to dividend increase has weakened over the 
period from 1984-2003.  This is important as it is the first time in the literature that 
such a relationship has been documented.  This result is most likely as a result of 
improved corporate governance, better and more timely financial statements, and 
more efficient methods of making distributions to shareholders (ie share repurchases).  
This means that the first hypothesis can be confirmed.   
2) The market reaction to dividend increases is larger in bull markets than in bear 
markets.  This is a surprising result as it was expected that the market’s reaction 
would be greater in times when capital gain returns were more uncertain.  A possible 
reason for this finding is that investors know that dividends place cash flow 
constraints on a firm as they are rarely cut or decreased by management.  Knowing 
this, investors might rather have management hold on to the cash during difficult 
economic times as the capital might be needed to stay solvent or invest in positive 
NPV projects.  This illustrates a possibility where investors want to increase the 
amount of cash available to managers, which contradicts the predictions of agency 
theory.  Another possible reason is that larger firms increased their dividend in the 
second time period, and larger firms are less likely to need the signals that dividends 
may provide.   
3) The third hypothesis stated that institutional ownership should play an important 
factor in dividend valuation because it should reduce agency costs and act as a signal 
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of firm quality, both of which are hypothetical functions of dividends.  What was 
found is that institutional ownership does not play a role in how the market reacts to a 
dividend increase.  In all time periods and in any partition of the sample I was not 
able to find any relationship between institutional holdings and dividends.   
4) The debt to equity relationship was found to be positive, when agency theory predicts 
that it should be negative.  It was expected to be negative because Jensen (1986) 
stated that interest payments would discipline management’s spending similarly to 
dividend payments, and thus agency costs would already be reduced for firms that 
have high debt levels.  What was found instead was that firms with high debt levels 
have dividends valued greater than firms with low debt levels.  It is proposed that the 
positive relationship exists because investors interpret an increase in dividends to 
firms with high debt levels as a signal that the firm’s cash flows are stable and large 
enough to maintain the higher dividend level indefinitely.   
5) The fifth hypothesis tested in this thesis was in regards to a firm’s free cash flows and 
its dividend policy.  The agency theory of dividends proposes that the greater the free 
cash flows of a firm, the greater the market should react to a dividend increase as this 
increase would decrease the potential amount of agency conflicts.  Rather than 
finding this, a significantly negative relationship was found to exist depending on the 
proxy used to measure free cash flows.  The original measure of free cash flow as 
described in section 4.2 was found to be insignificant over the entire time period as 
reported in Table 4, but the lagged measure of free cash flow and the cash and cash 
equivalents measure were found to be significant in Table 5.  In section 5.4 (which 
focused on testing for differences in valuation before and after the market crash) 
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Table 12 shows that the free cash flow measure was significant for the time period 
1990-1999, and it was found to be significant in its base level in Table 13 after all the 
variables were interacted with the crash dummy variable.  This evidence leads to the 
conclusion that agency theory does not hold, and in fact (similar to the debt to equity 
relationship) there is evidence to support that the opposite relationship is true.  Even 
if one does not feel that the relationship is statistically significant (as significance is 
dependent on the time period and the proxy chosen) there is no evidence to support 
the hypothesized relationship between free cash flows and dividends.   
6) A firm’s liquidity is an important factor in how the market reacts to an increase in 
dividends.  In addition, it becomes increasingly more important after the stock market 
started to decline.  This confirms the sixth hypothesis, which states that firms with 
higher liquidity have less to gain from dividend increases.  
7) The seventh hypothesis was confirmed. It means that the market’s reaction to a 
dividend increase is more pronounced for firms whose q-ratio is less than one.  This 
confirms the earlier work of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) as they also found this 
relationship.  They assumed that firms with q-ratios less than unity (or less than one) 
were firms with high levels of free cash flows.  From this they concluded that 
dividends were valued because they reduced agency problems.  What was found in 
this study was that q-ratios had no correlation with the free cash flow measure, thus 
their assumption about free cash flows and q-ratios seems unfounded.  Also, the 
relationships that agency theory predicts between the market’s reaction to an increase 
to dividend and free cash flows & debt do not hold; and there is some evidence that 
the opposite relationship holds. With this information, it is most likely that the results 
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observed in regards to a firm’s q-ratio are caused by the market interpreting the 
increased dividend to mean that these firms have better investment prospects than 
they were originally thought to have.  
8) The final hypothesis tested was in regards to the changes in volume that occur around 
the dividend change. Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) investigate volume 
changes surrounding dividend omissions and initiations and were not able to find any 
significant increases in volume.  They did this in hopes to find evidence that there 
was change in dividend clientele by noticing a change in volume.  The data presented 
here shows that the market reaction to dividend increases is positively related to the 
changes in volume over periods of 2, 5, and 10 days after the dividend increase.  This 
may be the result of the firm changing its dividend clientele as Michaely et al. (1995) 
proposed.    
6.2  Future Research 
Future research into this area might focus on trying to determine if the market’s reaction 
to share repurchases has also changed over a similar time period.  If it is shown that the market 
reacts more now than it once did, then a payout substitution theory could be presented which 
would state that market has increased its desire for share repurchases at the expense of dividends.  
This theory would give evidence that the declining propensity of firms to pay a dividend is a 
result of changing investor tastes.     
 It would also be important to test whether firms that have high debt levels are signalling 
to the market about their future performance by increasing their dividends.  It is proposed from 
the fact that the debt to equity coefficient has the opposite relationship that agency theory 
predicts, that the market may interpret a dividend increase from firms with high debt levels as a 
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signal of future performance.  The signal being that the firm feels that future cash flows will be 
high enough for both already high debt levels and the new higher dividend.  In order to test this 
properly the method developed by Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) should be used.  This 
method focused on the difference between actual income and the income that was projected by 
analysts. The difference rather than levels of income should be used because the increased 
dividend is supposed to be sending new information to the market that the market does not 
currently incorporate into share price. 
 Finally, the evidence from this thesis contradicts the agency theory of dividends. 
Therefore, the signalling theory of dividends should be given more attention as it may explain 
the behaviour of firms towards dividends and the market’s reaction to dividend increases.   
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